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<channel><title><![CDATA[Arete Asset Management - A better way to invest - Blog]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog]]></link><description><![CDATA[Blog]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 17:46:13 -0400</pubDate><generator>EditMySite</generator><item><title><![CDATA[Areté market commentary: History in the making]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-commentary]]></link><comments><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-commentary#comments]]></comments><pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 12:16:24 GMT</pubDate><category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-commentary</guid><description><![CDATA[by David Robertson, CFA&#8203;August 2026Program note: With this issue begins an experiment to move my commentary piece away from the quarter-end, which tends to be extremely busy anyway, to the middle of the quarter which more easily allows for reflection.Two Wars, No ConfirmationThe dog days of summer are a good time for the beach, a vacation, or &mdash; for the more restless among us &mdash; a hard look at the dynamics that will drive investment performance for years to come. Two stand out as [...] ]]></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="paragraph"><font size="3">by David Robertson, CFA<br />&#8203;August 2026<br /><br /><strong>Program note: </strong>With this issue begins an experiment to move my commentary piece away from the quarter-end, which tends to be extremely busy anyway, to the middle of the quarter which more easily allows for reflection.<br /><br /><strong>Two Wars, No Confirmation</strong><br />The dog days of summer are a good time for the beach, a vacation, or &mdash; for the more restless among us &mdash; a hard look at the dynamics that will drive investment performance for years to come. Two stand out as genuine "difference makers." One is the emerging war on capital, in which nations compete against one another for a limited pool of savings as capital requirements (for national defense, AI buildout, energy security, reindustrialization, etc.) skyrocket. The other is the widening arc of conflict in the Middle East. Markets, so far, are barely registering either one.<br /><br /><strong>The Capital War Arrives</strong><br />The capital war isn't yet known by that name. It surfaced in late July as a currency intervention in the Japanese yen. The headline detail wasn't the mechanics of the intervention; it was that the US Treasury participated alongside Japan (<em><a href="https://abetterwaytoinvest.substack.com/p/observations-by-david-robertson-8726">Observations, 8/7/26</a></em>). <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/86dbf0c1-d127-4255-85af-602afc30228e?syn-25a6b1a6=1">Barry Eichengreen ($) called</a> the move a source of "troubling information about the dollar". He reads it as a sign that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is worried that propping up the yen by selling dollar securities would add further strain to the long end of the US Treasury market.<br /><br />Russell Napier frames the joint intervention as a much bigger inflection point in the ongoing saga of Japanese debt (<em>The Solid Ground</em>, 8/5/2026). For decades, Japanese savers have parked money abroad chasing yields unavailable at home, where authorities suppressed interest rates. The imbalance this produced is enormous. Japanese investors now (latest measure, as of June 2025) hold approximately $2.9T of liquid US securities &ndash; including stocks, Treasury bonds, and agency and corporate debt.<br /><br />Japan has spent the past couple of years taking tentative steps to unwind that imbalance including nudging rates higher and intervening periodically in currency markets. Thus far, neither have triggered a disorderly devaluation nor a rate hike severe enough to break its economy. However, this cautious program of tinkering hasn&rsquo;t alleviated longer-term concerns about debt sustainability either.<br /><br />Napier compares this cautious approach to the "Phoney War" of September 1939 to May 1940, when Europe saw plenty of declarations of war but little actual fighting. His point: in 1939, the declarations were the real signal, not the quiet that followed them. He argues the joint yen intervention marks the same kind of turning point. Since "capital wars have moved beyond the phoney war of the past two years&rdquo;, Napier argues, &ldquo;capital flows will now more quickly be politicised."<br /><br />Two consequences follow, in Napier's view:</font><ul><li><font size="3"><strong>US policymakers will fight to direct any repatriation of global capital away from US assets.</strong> In other words, if Japan and other net-saver nations start bringing capital home, Washington will do what it can to make sure they liquidate non-US holdings first.</font></li><li><font size="3"><strong>Other countries will retaliate in kind. </strong>Each country will employ whatever leverage it has to protect its own markets. One of the most direct courses will be to &ldquo;weaponize&rdquo; domestic savings institutions by selling US assets and buying domestic assets. This &ldquo;Mexican standoff&rdquo; of asset sales will push bond yields up and stock prices down around the world.</font></li></ul><font size="3"><strong><br />&#8203;It is important to realize the potential scale of the conflict if it does broaden out into widespread retaliation. To give some sense for size, the US has about $37.4T in liquid securities that are owned by foreign entities which could ostensibly be sold in a capital war. That is notably bigger than an entire year&rsquo;s worth of GDP (at about $31T). If even a fraction of that total flowed out without being offset by comparable buying, it would be enormously disruptive to US markets.</strong><br /><br /><strong>The Middle East Conflict Widens</strong><br />At the same time, the conflict in Iran has broadened from a narrow confrontation with a rogue state into a much larger entanglement across the Middle East. Robert Pape called this early: the US has fallen into an "Escalation Trap," where the political cost to President Trump of walking away exceeds the cost of continuing to escalate. That trap has let Iran expand the conflict's scope &mdash; from a dispute over nuclear weapons, to control of the Strait of Hormuz and the oil that flows through it, to a broader claim on increased regional influence.<br /><br />Iran shows no interest in giving that influence back. Vali Nasr, an Iran specialist at Johns Hopkins, told the <em>FT</em> that Tehran no longer views a negotiated settlement as realistic. White House statements about ongoing talks notwithstanding, the facts on the ground suggest otherwise.<br /><br /><strong>Meanwhile, global cushions of oil storage and strategic reserves keep shrinking. As inventories approach operational minimums, the odds of outright shortages rise sharply. At the same time, Pape and Nasr (and other geopolitical experts) suggest a resolution is unlikely before the end of the year. Insofar as this continues, parts of the global economy will quite literally start running out of gas. The clock is ticking.</strong><br /><br /><strong>Where the Two Wars Meet</strong><br />These two dynamics reinforce each other. The clearest lesson of the Iran conflict, for Middle Eastern states and everyone else watching, is that US military strength hasn't delivered the political outcomes it was meant to secure. Washington didn't achieve regime change in Iran, didn't curb its nuclear program, and lost effective control of the Strait of Hormuz. It has struggled to fully protect regional allies, and its munitions stockpiles are known to be badly depleted.<br /><br /><strong>The net effect has been to erode the perceived value of America's defense guarantees worldwide. That's a problem for the capital war specifically: a credible defense guarantee is exactly the kind of leverage that matters when nations are competing for capital. As the guarantee's credibility fades, so does the leverage it once provided.</strong><br /><br /><strong>Why the Market Isn't Reacting</strong><br />Two arguably historic shifts are underway &mdash; a decades-long flow of Japanese savings starting to reverse, and a Middle East power balance being redrawn in ways likely to ripple globally. Markets could hardly seem to care less. That's unfortunate for the many investors it will eventually catch offside, but it's also one of the rare setups for real outperformance by those paying attention.<br /><br />Part of the disconnect is structural. Passive investing has reshaped how markets process information, and not merely by reducing the number of investors doing fundamental analysis. As Mike Green has explained, it changes what's rational for the remaining active investors to focus on in the first place: instead of estimating fundamental value and waiting for price to converge to it, the more profitable strategy becomes anticipating what the largest mechanical flow of capital, i.e., the passive bid, is about to do next.<br /><br />The upshot is that prices increasingly reflect guesses about where money will flow rather than judgments about what securities are actually worth. That can involve chasing hot narratives such as semiconductors or hyperscalers or guessing that grifters will continue to grift without consequences. <strong>The main point is that the trade is about flow, not value. As a result, market prices conceal risk because they contain so little fundamental information.</strong><br /><br /><strong>The Bottom Line</strong><br />History is being made on two fronts at once. A generational tide of foreign savings is starting to ebb which will be especially problematic for US financial assets. In addition, the balance of power in the Middle East is being rewritten in ways that will ripple far beyond the region. In the meantime, investors are being rewarded for guessing where money will move rather than for judging what things are worth.<br /><br />This unusual combination sets the stage for the kind of historic reversal in fortunes that occurs every once in a great while. Most notably, there will be a tremendous opportunity to significantly mitigate downside risk by recognizing these important dynamics and acting on them.</font></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Areté market review Q1 2026: Markets in the Crossfire]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q1-2026-markets-in-the-crossfire]]></link><comments><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q1-2026-markets-in-the-crossfire#comments]]></comments><pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 19:22:05 GMT</pubDate><category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q1-2026-markets-in-the-crossfire</guid><description><![CDATA[by David Robertson, CFAApril 2026After flatlining for most of the first two months of the year, stocks turned decidedly down in March. If not for a healthy rebound on the last day of March, it would have been a pretty ugly quarter. Bonds didn't fare much better. After perking up in late February, bonds gave back all their gains to finish the quarter nearly flat.While performance could easily have been worse, investors were left frazzled nonetheless. The emergence of a war in Iran with no warning [...] ]]></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="paragraph"><font size="3">by David Robertson, CFA<br />April 2026<br /><br />After flatlining for most of the first two months of the year, stocks turned decidedly down in March. If not for a healthy rebound on the last day of March, it would have been a pretty ugly quarter. Bonds didn't fare much better. After perking up in late February, bonds gave back all their gains to finish the quarter nearly flat.<br /><br />While performance could easily have been worse, investors were left frazzled nonetheless. The emergence of a war in Iran with no warning and day-to-day changes in narrative created a climate of unpredictability which left investors frustrated and exhausted. One headline captured the psychology: "'Numb, Overwhelmed, Petrified?' FAs Say Clients Are Anxious."<br /><br />In such an environment, how can investors make sense of what is going on?<br /><br /><strong>The Reality: An Escalation Trap</strong><br />For starters, the war in Iran causes all kinds of problems for investors who tend to be confounded by geopolitics. Even in the best of times, investors tend to assume geopolitics away &mdash; partly as being "unpredictable" and partly as being transient. This is wrong, and it's a cop-out. There is a logic to geopolitics, and there are frameworks that make it understandable.<br /><br />One of the most relevant today is Professor Robert Pape's theory of the "Escalation Trap" (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HrVsTTCoVeU">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HrVsTTCoVeU</a>). Pape's background in air power, political violence, social media propaganda, and terrorism make him particularly well-positioned to analyze the war in Iran.<br />&#8203;<br />One of the key points Pape makes is that military success is often mistakenly conflated with political success. In the case of Iran, the US military has been incredibly competent with targeting and tactics. However, that success does not automatically translate into political success. <a href="https://www.panoptica.com/but-i-did-have-breakfast-kill-chains-self-reflection-and-the-iran-debacle/">Ben Hunt ($) explains</a> why such a disconnect can occur:</font></div>  <blockquote><font size="3">There's an old military saying... The enemy gets a vote. Meaning that no matter how badly you're beating the other guy on the battlefield, no matter how much you would sue for peace if the situation were reversed, no matter how much you believe that you have a dominant strategy that constrains the other guy's choices, there is ALWAYS a range of choices for the other guy and you do NOT have the final say on what that choice might be.<br />&#8203;<br />It can work for a while, this mirroring of your own raw preferences onto others, particularly if you start from a really strong position and can just steamroll the other players. But eventually you run into someone you can't steamroll. And they vote in a way that you weren't expecting. And then you lose.</font></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3">Iran has voted in a way Trump didn't expect. While the bombing campaign has been extremely successful in destroying physical targets, Iran has not acquiesced. <strong>In fact, on the political realities that matter most, it has actually gained advantage. It now controls the Strait of Hormuz, which means it can extract tolls and be selective about which ships pass. The longer this continues, the more it becomes normalized. Meanwhile, its uranium supply has dispersed and there is virtually no intelligence on where it has gone &mdash; increasing the risk of radiological weapons reaching anywhere in the Middle East. For those keeping score, none of this constitutes US success.<br /></strong><br />In short, whatever threat was considered to have made the situation untenable before, the situation is much more untenable now. <a href="https://escalationtrap.substack.com/p/the-questions-that-matter-now">As Pape ($) explains</a>, "we are approaching the decision point where it becomes much harder [for US involvement to stop]." He goes on:</font><br /></div>  <blockquote><font size="3">&#8203;Wars don't become uncontrollable gradually. They become uncontrollable when one side crosses into a form of escalation that changes the structure of the conflict. That threshold is ground force entry. Ground war is different. It produces sustained exposure, longer timelines, and political and military commitments that are hard to unwind.</font><br /></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3">This invites the question: what are the real signals that a ground war is coming? Pape's answer is, "Not rhetoric. Not deadlines" &mdash; but rather, logistics. <strong>The presence of thousands of Marines in theater with more on the way is a strong signal. There are several others. This is an escalation trap in real time.<br /></strong><br /><strong>Cascading Consequences</strong><br />The main message from Pape and Hunt is that there is a much greater chance of severe disruption than markets, consumers, or President Trump are acknowledging.<br /><br />Rory Johnston states flat out: "If the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, there is no doubt that the global price of crude oil will explode to all-time highs." The reason is that in wealthy, advanced economies, there is almost no price too high to destroy demand. Conversely, developing countries face a disastrous lifestyle adjustment.<br /><br />Nearly all analyses assume the Strait will reopen and become fully functional again. This flies in the face of the fact that Iran currently controls it. Not only is it effectively closed to normal traffic, but Iran is charging tolls on selected traffic. Given the realization of its newfound power, Iran is highly unlikely to concede it without a fight.<br /><br />Trump has already floated the prospect of the US simply walking away and letting others figure out the Strait. <strong>With this new reality, no country that depends on regular delivery of products from the Gulf can assume future supply will be uninterrupted. This is a defining event. From now on, everyone is going to demand larger safety stocks, greater defense capabilities, and better resilience.<br /></strong><br />In addition, every other strait in the world is now also vulnerable to the same kind of shakedown &mdash; the proof of concept has been established at Hormuz.<br /><br />Disruptions should also be expected elsewhere. As <a href="https://www.theinstitutionalriskanalyst.com/post/theira828">John Dizard notes</a>, it doesn't appear as if there was any planning for indirect consequences:</font><br /></div>  <blockquote><font size="3">I think that the White House or the planning team was looking solely at oil flows. They may have looked at the US's relatively good supply balance, but they didn't look at products. They didn't look at the US requirement to import sulfur, for example. For the US to produce phosphate fertilizer, it has to process its own phosphate rock with sulfuric acid. <strong>Most &mdash; around half &mdash; of traded sulfur in the world goes through the Strait of Hormuz. It's a byproduct of refining very sulfurous, or "sour," crude. Sulfur wasn't being considered as a pain point in the past. Now it is. You need sulfuric acid in order to produce copper, steel, nickel, and many other products. Apart from fertilizer, you really need it to keep an industrial society running.</strong></font><br /></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3">As it stands, we are already in the first wave of industrial production getting throttled due to shortages of sulfuric acid. Without a clear resolution in the next couple of weeks, companies will need to start shutting down.<br /><br />More regional disruptions are developing as well. Dizard points to a serious fuel supply crunch in California, given refinery closures and the state&rsquo;s dependence on imported fuel from Asia. He also notes Europe is heading toward diesel rationing, jet fuel rationing, and serious shortages more broadly.<br /><br /><strong>The Great Disconnect: Why Markets Aren&rsquo;t Reacting -- Yet</strong><br />Despite all the signs of continuing conflict and the likelihood of severe disruption, analysts and investors remain unusually sanguine. To understand why, it helps to consider some historical context.<br /><br />Dating back to the Global Financial Crisis, investors have relied heavily on public figures to support financial assets. First, it was the Fed with Quantitative Easing as "the only game in town." Then it was government by way of fiscal stimulus during the pandemic. Then Treasury played a role by suppressing pressure on long-term bond yields by issuing disproportionately large amounts of short-term bills. More recently it has been President Trump regularly declaring a "golden age" for America.<br /><br /><strong>In each case, large swaths of investors essentially outsourced the investment function to public authorities &mdash; and now an entire generation of analysts knows of no other way.<br /></strong><br />It is also important to realize that such policy success was much less a function of omnipotent leaders than it was the good fortune of having adequate capacity. The Fed was able to keep rates so low for so long partly because there was no practicable policy alternative from Congress and partly because there was no political opposition to it. The government was able to keep economic growth at reasonably healthy rates only by massively outspending its revenues and running its debt burden progressively higher. Both courses are rapidly running out of room.<br /><br />This conditioning explains a great deal about why equity strategists remain so calm today. As <a href="https://bobeunlimited.substack.com/p/equity-analyst-delusions">Bob Elliott ($) observes</a>, "Nearly all of them are making the same basic case that with earnings 'accelerating' and prices down, the stock market has already endured a near 20% valuation drawdown in response to the war." <strong>Such arguments seem reasonable on the surface since earnings growth is expected to be nearly 18% in both 2026 and 2027. The problem is that actual earnings are doing no such thing.<br /></strong><br />The dissonance in earnings estimates is mainly a quirk of sell-side analyst behavior. Oil industry analysts are quick to raise estimates because higher oil prices are easy to plug into models. Analysts in other industries, however, are biding their time: &ldquo;if this blows over swiftly, there's no reason to update full-year estimates &mdash; that's a pain to do, so they wait with unchanged views&rdquo;. As a result, it&rsquo;s more accurate to say earnings estimates are stale than that they are rising.<br /><br /><strong>Lessons for Investors</strong><br />So there are good reasons for investors to feel anxious. The dominant narratives being told about the war in Iran significantly understate the consequences. The Trump administration does not have control of the situation, and in the absence of control, the universe of possibilities &mdash; especially negative ones &mdash; expands greatly.<br /><br />There is no magic formula or silver bullet that can suddenly make everything OK. The war in Iran is likely to be longer and more consuming than people have been expecting, and its consequences are already rippling through the global economy.<br /><br />This presents a double whammy for investors. It heralds the end of a halcyon era during which investors could simply follow the guidance of public officials and expect "number go up." It also reveals the disturbing reality that the price paid for perpetuating that narrative was the mortgaging of our future. In short, the best days for investment returns are behind us &mdash; at least for a long time.<br /><br /><strong>The time it takes for this new reality to become widely appreciated will be a key driver of financial asset prices.</strong> A great deal of muscle memory has been developed for letting risk assets ride. For many, the fear of missing out is still greater than the fear of losing money. Many people simply don't have the bandwidth in their personal lives to draw the lines from geopolitical developments to stock returns. And there will be no small amount of denial.<br /><br /><strong>But the passage of time will reveal that the odds have changed. No longer is goldilocks the baseline expectation &mdash; it is the outlier. Once again, mistakes and bad bets will have consequences, which will prove especially problematic in a highly leveraged world.<br /></strong><br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />Investors are right to feel anxious. The dizzying pace of narrative changes combined with a wobble in stocks in the first quarter are signs of deeper issues at hand. The potential for a significant slowdown in economic growth combined with supply-side pressure on prices has risen significantly. This is simply the result of eyes-wide-open risk assessment.<br /><br /><strong>In order to make the most of this new environment, investors will need to do two things they have been conditioned to eschew for the last eighteen years. One is to hold official narratives lightly at best &mdash; which probably means either doing their own homework or finding someone who is really good at it. The other is to manage risk. After nearly two decades of deferred consequences, risk management will again become a pre-eminent concern.<br /></strong><br />The new environment will be especially unkind to investors who are planning on sitting, waiting, and wishing for things to get better. Conversely, investors who embrace independent research and risk management will be able to chart a productive course forward and avoid a lot of obstacles along the way.<br /><br />The silver lining is this: there are more accessible sources of quality information than there ever have been, and there is a real logic to macroeconomic and geopolitical developments that can be followed and understood. This may well mark the beginning of a golden age of investment analysis &mdash; even as it ends a golden age of simply riding the tide.&nbsp;</font><br /></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Areté market review Q4 25]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q4-25]]></link><comments><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q4-25#comments]]></comments><pubDate>Tue, 20 Jan 2026 12:51:57 GMT</pubDate><category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q4-25</guid><description><![CDATA[by David Robertson, CFAJanuary 2026Despite a fair amount of news and histrionics in the fourth quarter, stock and bond returns were relatively modest. The S&amp;P 500 posted a moderate rise of about 2.5% and the TLT bond ETF lost about 1%. Unspectacular returns contrasted notably with political rhetoric around the government shutdown, the Epstein files, and countless other items. In short, headline volatility was high; market volatility wasn&rsquo;t.This year is starting off with the Trump admin [...] ]]></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="paragraph"><font size="3">by David Robertson, CFA<br />January 2026<br /><br />Despite a fair amount of news and histrionics in the fourth quarter, stock and bond returns were relatively modest. The S&amp;P 500 posted a moderate rise of about 2.5% and the TLT bond ETF lost about 1%. Unspectacular returns contrasted notably with political rhetoric around the government shutdown, the Epstein files, and countless other items. In short, headline volatility was high; market volatility wasn&rsquo;t.<br /><br />This year is starting off with the Trump administration's guns a-blazing in pushing its activist agenda. The bull case is straightforward: fiscal and monetary stimulus will provide consistent tailwinds for financial assets. The bear case is also strong, however: the net policy impact is neutral to negative for consumer demand, the global rate cutting regime is over, and the elimination of institutional guardrails increases tail risk. The challenge for investors is figuring out what all of it means for financial assets.<br /><br /><strong>Hot, hot, hot</strong><br /><br />There is an easy case to make that the Trump administration is going to "run it hot" and that investors should prepare for further market appreciation this year. The signature legislative act last year, the budget bill, extended tax cuts for many, will produce refunds for many this year, and creates new investment incentives for businesses.<br /><br />In addition, the administration continues to press for lower rates. While markets are currently pricing in only one or two more rate cuts in 2026, the three cuts from last year are still working their way through and easing financial conditions. In addition, bond volatility (i.e., the MOVE index) has crashed to lows not seen since the pandemic era of ultra-low interest rates.<br /><br />Finally, the Trump administration is also pushing ahead with efforts to reduce regulation. Various initiatives have focused on energy, permitting and approvals, bank capital requirements (lower), and enforcement (lower) among others. One of the clear effects has been to ease the way for corporate consolidation.<br /><br />&#8203;By this telling, stocks are in a "Goldilocks" environment with significant upside potential. It's pretty clear a lot of retail investors are taking the message at face value and buying stocks hand over fist. <a href="https://www.grantspub.com/resources/commentary.cfm">Almost Daily Grant's (January 6, 2026) reported</a>:</font></div>  <blockquote><font size="3">&#8203;<strong>retail investors are carrying an increasingly heavy load as the bull market stretches into its fourth year. Citing data from Citadel Securities, The Wall Street Journal relayed last week that the cohort accounted for 22% of domestic equity turnover in October, the highest share on record outside the February 2021 meme stonk revolution.</strong> That figure remained at or above 20% for the bulk of 2025, compared to a 10% baseline seen during the two years prior to the pandemic and about 15% during the 2022 selloff.</font></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3"><strong>Devil's advocate</strong><br /><br />That kind of aggressive buying is hard to square with the disconfirming evidence. It doesn't take much of an adversarial review to expose significant weaknesses along each dimension of the Goldilocks view.<br /><br />&#8203;For one, it's not at all clear tax refunds will provide such a big boost. <a href="https://bobeunlimited.substack.com/p/false-hopes-for-a-1h26-stimulus-boom">Bob Elliott ($) dissects</a> the refund mechanics and finds them less than compelling:&nbsp;</font></div>  <blockquote><font size="3">&#8203;Most estimates [for tax refunds] suggest that this will amount to an incremental 500 bucks across roughly 100mln filers which amounts to essentially a 50bln incremental injection into the economy. But since the vast majority of these measures are <em>deductions</em> and not credits, the refunds will be concentrated among higher income households who of course have lower spending propensity.</font></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3">As a result, we should expect only a fraction of that $50B and it should be expected to be spaced out through the year. In addition, those more modest benefits are going to be offset by the rollback in ACA (Affordable Care Act) premiums and cuts in SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) benefits. <strong>The net result, Elliott concludes, is "Hardly the mix that would create a surge in demand to kick off the year".</strong><br /><br />&#8203;Nor are rates likely to provide a big incremental boost. Markets currently price only one to two more cuts in the US in 2026 and most other major central banks are already on pause or are raising rates. <a href="https://vconstancio.substack.com/p/fed-cuts-the-ecb-holds">Vitor Constancio highlighted</a> the divergent trajectories of major central banks and also showed how European central bankers have become incrementally more hawkish in recent months. He reported:</font></div>  <blockquote><font size="3"><strong>"More than 60% of respondents in a Bloomberg survey say officials are more likely to raise borrowing costs than lower them</strong> &mdash; a meaningful change from October, when only a third shared that outlook."</font></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3">&#8203;Finally, not all regulatory action is uniformly positive either. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ace5549f-468e-4ddb-adf3-88dd495cd1ea">Brandon Greeley ($) points out</a>&nbsp;rules and regulations don't just pop out of nowhere:&nbsp;</font></div>  <blockquote><font size="3">&#8203;There is a saying in America&rsquo;s military that every boring, senseless rule was written in blood once. The same is true for the institutions of America&rsquo;s money. They were all designed, one after the other, after something exciting happened.</font></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3">&#8203;This isn't to say that each rule or regulation was perfectly drafted and has perfectly withstood the test of time. It is to say, though, that there was a reason for drafting virtually all of them. Some crisis or some major failure served as the impetus. As a result, the wholesale elimination of such regulations invites repeats of all the original crises. This appears to be what the Trump administration is doing:&nbsp;&nbsp;</font></div>  <blockquote><font size="3">&#8203;The Trump administration has treated not just the Fed, but all of them [regulatory agencies for finance] with disdain. Trump&rsquo;s SEC has slowed enforcement actions, and abandoned cases. Trump advisers were reported to have considered absorbing the FDIC into the Treasury department in the transition to power. The administration has sought to close the CFPB. And now Trump has made clear his designs on the Fed, which doesn&rsquo;t just set rates. It regulates banks. It distributes cash around the country. Its swap lines make the global dollar system possible.</font></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3"><strong>Rules exist at least partly to ensure fair play. When people sense there isn't a level playing field, they withdraw. That's the big risk - consumers and investors pull back for fear of having adequate protection.</strong><br /><br /><strong>Right size the exposure</strong><br /><br />So, an objective analysis of the investment landscape alone reveals there are several good reasons for investors to be cautious in the new year. There are others.<br /><br />One reason is the risk of loss. Of course, the <em>perception</em> of risk of loss has been significantly attenuated by the enormous quantity of fiscal and monetary stimulus the last few years, but that doesn't change the <em>actual</em> risk of severe losses. Misperception makes it easy to become undisciplined. Oftentimes, the time to worry most is when confidence is highest.<br /><br />The potential consequences are the key here and investors often underestimate the damage losses can cause. Part of the reason for this is a technical concept called ergodicity. It means that return averages can be misleading because individuals don&rsquo;t get the average outcome &mdash; they get the one path they actually experience. While that one path can seem like so much bad luck at the time, it can also be a life-changing experience.<br /><br />The reality that investment losses can be devastating and extremely hard to recover from is captured by Warren Buffett&rsquo;s two rules:</font><ol><li><font size="3">Rule No. 1: Never lose money.</font></li><li><font size="3">Rule No. 2: Never forget Rule No. 1.</font></li></ol><font size="3"><br /><strong>The primacy of loss avoidance highlights the importance of diversification, the avoidance of leverage, maintenance of a cash cushion, and emphasis of risk management over return chasing.</strong> These activities aren't always as much fun, but they do help insulate investors from the worst possible outcomes.<br /><br /><strong>Unicorns and rainbows</strong><br /><br /><strong>&#8203;Another reason to be cautious about markets in the new year is the possibility that bullish market narratives are being designed at least in part to recruit incremental retail buying so as to provide exit liquidity for others.</strong> Clearly the private equity industry has been working hard to increase retail investment to provide capital backfill after a few years of below average exits (sales) of portfolio companies.<br /><br />The characterization of retail investors as gullible sources of capital can also explain the effusive praise of stocks by Wall Street: Someone is needed to keep buying stocks at record highs to keep the financial machine going. In more colloquial terms, someone needs to be left holding the bag.<br /><br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br /><br />&#8203;There is an awful lot of enthusiasm for stocks in the new year. However, there is also a lot of political and economic disruption. <strong>Investors would do well to consider both perspectives as well as the downside risk if things turn south. The potential for tail risk, and the durable harm it can cause investment portfolios, is quite high.</strong></font></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Areté market review Q3 25]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q3-25]]></link><comments><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q3-25#comments]]></comments><pubDate>Thu, 30 Oct 2025 11:55:21 GMT</pubDate><category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q3-25</guid><description><![CDATA[by David Robertson, CFAOctober 2025The third quarter was a good one for stocks in which they spent a good chunk of the time hitting fresh new record highs. In addition, while the path of travel for bonds was less smooth, the general upward direction (yields downward) was similar.&nbsp;Such benign outcomes resulted despite an increasing array of risks. Why do stocks keep storming ahead and what does it mean for investors?&nbsp;Same ole, same oleSome of the reasons behind the stock rally are quite [...] ]]></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="paragraph"><font size="3">by David Robertson, CFA<br />October 2025<br /><br />The third quarter was a good one for stocks in which they spent a good chunk of the time hitting fresh new record highs. In addition, while the path of travel for bonds was less smooth, the general upward direction (yields downward) was similar.<br />&nbsp;<br />Such benign outcomes resulted despite an increasing array of risks. Why do stocks keep storming ahead and what does it mean for investors?<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>Same ole, same ole</strong><br />Some of the reasons behind the stock rally are quite familiar. Artificial intelligence remains a powerful narrative and these stocks remain key drivers of major indexes. In addition, heightened participation by retail investors has also been persistent through the year. Add in some end of year seasonality and investors have plenty of reasons to be optimistic.<br />&nbsp;<br />Arguably the biggest driver of optimism, however, has been the shift to easier monetary policy. Clearly, investors have been expecting the Fed to continue easing, well after the cut on Wednesday. In addition, the end of the Fed&rsquo;s Quantitative Tightening program also eases concerns.<br />&nbsp;<br />Nonetheless, there are still a lot of risks that investors seem to be shunning. Credit problems continue to pop up with annoying regularity and evidence keeps mounting that consumers are getting squeezed.<br />&nbsp;<br />Geopolitically, there is a whole grab bag of risks. Debt problems in France threaten the entire Eurozone, Russia&rsquo;s war in Ukraine is an ongoing threat, and Japan is celebrating a new prime minister but still faces the intractable problem of too much debt and too little growth. Finally, as China&rsquo;s new five-year plan made evident, the differences between it and the US are structural and will not be resolved with any trade &ldquo;deals&rdquo;.<br />&nbsp;<br />Finally, even though monetary policy is easing, the liquidity environment has been tightening up. Indications such as elevated repo rates and increased use of the Standing Repo Facility have been expected as the Fed has reduced its balance sheet. While the Fed would almost certainly act quickly if liquidity dried up suddenly, the entire goal of normalizing its balance sheet is to expose liquidity to market-based discipline. Such discipline will counterbalance the benefits of monetary policy easing.<br />&nbsp;<br />Adding all the pieces together, this list of factors that can undermine risk assets is not a trivial one. Why do investors seem so unconcerned?<br />&nbsp;<br />One clue may also be part of the answer: Low volatility. With the exception of a brief flare up a couple of weeks ago, the VIX index declined rapidly and remained sedate since &ldquo;Liberation Day&rdquo; tariffs were announced in April. Perhaps even more impressively, the S&amp;P 500 has remained above its 50-day moving average since May. That&rsquo;s a rare lack of variation.<br />&nbsp;<br />Bonds have also joined in on the fun with an even more impressive decline in the MOVE index (of bond volatility) since April. So, what&rsquo;s the deal? What explains the dearth of volatility?<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>Carry on my wayward son</strong><br />One interpretation that fits especially well is that the carry trade is ramping back up. Low volatility provides a favorable environment and both anecdotal evidence and foreign currency flows support the view.<br />&nbsp;<br />I&rsquo;ve discussed the carry trade in several reports (<a href="https://abetterwaytoinvest.substack.com/p/observations-by-david-robertson-41825">here</a>, <a href="https://abetterwaytoinvest.substack.com/p/observations-by-david-robertson-61424">here</a>, <a href="https://abetterwaytoinvest.substack.com/p/observations-by-david-robertson-12321">here</a>, and <a href="https://abetterwaytoinvest.substack.com/p/arete-blog-market-review-q221">here</a>, for example). In each of those I have referenced <em>The Rise of Carry: The Dangerous Consequences of Volatility Suppression and the New Financial Order of Decaying Growth and Recurring Crisis,</em> by Tim Lee, Jamie Lee, and Kevin Coldiron, which is an invaluable resource for the analysis of the carry trade. Not only does the book identify what comprises a carry trade, it discusses <em>why</em> it has been such a prominent phenomenon in recent years and <em>what</em> it implies for future market activity.<br />&nbsp;<br />For starters, the <em>Rise of Carry</em> describes in general terms how carry trades work:&nbsp;</font></div>  <blockquote>&#8203;<font size="3">Carry trades make money when &ldquo;nothing happens.&rdquo; In other words, &ldquo;they are financial transactions that produce a regular stream of income or accounting profits, but they subject the owner to the risk of a sudden loss when a particular event occurs or when underlying asset values change substantially.&rdquo;</font></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph">&#8203;<font size="3">In practical terms, &ldquo;The classic finance carry trade takes place in the foreign exchange market, when a trader borrows in a low interest rate currency and invests the proceeds in another, higher-yielding currency.&rdquo; In more colloquial terms, this is referred to as &ldquo;picking up nickels in front of a steam roller&rdquo;.<br />&nbsp;<br />While the carry trade certainly can be promoted by sophisticated hedge fund strategies, a lot of more recognizable, more pedestrian, activities also qualify. For example, buying higher-yielding stocks on margin, investing in structured products that produce income by selling volatility in some form, and corporations raising debt to repurchase equity all qualify as carry trades. The common thread is that in each case, &ldquo;the carry trader is either explicitly or implicitly betting that changes in underlying capital values will not wipe out his or her income return&rdquo;.<br />&nbsp;<br />Most importantly, <em>The Rise of Carry</em> reveals that carry trades define the investment landscape in important ways. In other words, when a carry regime is in effect, there is not only a number of observable characteristics (such as low volatility), there is a predictable dynamic (e.g., increasing debt). <strong>In short, if you know you are in a carry trade, you also have a very good idea, albeit very generalized, of what is going to happen.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br />One characteristic of a carry regime is that it &ldquo;results in a very suboptimal allocation of resources in the economy&rdquo;. From a free-market perspective this is just common sense because a carry regime suppresses volatility below what would be established by the forces of a free market:</font></div>  <blockquote><font size="3">The carry regime results in a suppression of interest rate spreads that rests on an assumption that central banks&mdash;and other governmental or multilateral institutions such as the IMF&mdash;will not allow excessive exchange rate volatility or asset price volatility in general and will effectively stand behind debt. <strong>This means that credit risk is mispriced from a free market perspective. It implies that there is an understanding that debt is at least partly socialized; the costs of default or failure will be at least partly shared across the economy, potentially the global economy, as a whole.</strong></font></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph">&#8203;<font size="3">As a result, the carry trade &ldquo;must fundamentally be a wealth-destroying process&rdquo;. This is a very important point. <strong>For whatever reason a governmental institution may decide to engage in volatility suppression -- to buy time, to form a bridge to pass over an emergency, to reset sentiment, or whatever -- it is doing so at the expense of longer-term prosperity. Indeed, such a decision to forgo longer-term benefit for short-term expediency is the exact opposite of investing for the future.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br />Another characteristic is that central banks normally play a central role in turbo-charging a carry regime. After all, guidance about rates and asset purchases not only provide powerful signals about intent, but also costly deterrents for any adventurers who may be inclined to trade against government resources. If a major central bank wants lower volatility, it certainly has plenty of tools to accomplish that for at least some period of time.<br />&nbsp;<br />In recent years, the Treasury has also gotten in on the act. Normally confined to preventing large moves in Treasury yields that could prove disruptive, the Treasury has become more aggressive in actively suppressing volatility. First under Janet Yellen, and now under Scott Bessent, Treasury has shifted issuance disproportionately to bills in order to prevent longer-term bond yields from rising too much. Regardless, it all amounts to the same thing: There is a prevailing institutional effort to suppress volatility.<br />&nbsp;<br />Such efforts come with a sting though. As &ldquo;central banks come to be seen as agents of carry &mdash; and carry comes to be properly understood as reinforcing inequality &mdash; then we can expect continuing challenges to their independence and objectives.&rdquo; Indeed, the volume of such challenges has grown notably this year. These challenges didn&rsquo;t just come out of nowhere and weren&rsquo;t entirely partisan. Instead, they were eminently foreseeable. Treasury runs this risk as well.<br />&nbsp;<br />A third characteristic of carry regimes is where the rubber hits the road for investors: &ldquo;<strong>when carry trades become prevalent in any financial market, it becomes virtually inevitable that they will crash</strong>&rdquo;. To repeat for those in the back, &ldquo;it becomes virtually inevitable that they will crash&rdquo;. As a result, the chances of a moderate correction have decreased and the chances of a disruptive decline have increased. That's just the way carry regimes work.<br />&nbsp;<br />Arguably, the risk is even greater than that. Because &ldquo;There is also evidence of a growing correlation between currency and equity market carry,&rdquo; there is a good chance &ldquo;that a single global volatility risk factor may be a driver of all forms of carry in the future.&rdquo; As the book concludes, &ldquo;If this is true, future carry crashes may impact all asset classes at the same time.&rdquo; Ouch.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>Implications</strong><br /><strong>The most important and most obvious implication is that there are virtually no safe places for investors to go for safe harbor in the event of a carry crash. Stocks don't work. Bonds don't work. Indeed, any risk asset ... is at risk.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br />Again, the risk is probably even greater because in a carry crash, the very nature of money comes into question: &ldquo;At the heart of the carry regime ... lies monetary instability&rdquo;. Ultimately, &ldquo;This means we need to prepare for potentially dramatic change in our monetary system, ultimately new monies, not reliant on central banks, will be likely to appear.&rdquo; After all, if people can't trust the central bank to be a good steward of a country's money, why should they trust the money to retain its value at all? So, even cash isn't super-safe.<br />&nbsp;<br />With such dire prospective consequences, it's a fair question as to why government authorities would ever allow a carry regime to develop, let alone to promote one. Certainly, mistakes get made, some individuals may not care as much about "other people's money", and hubris is always a possibility as well. <strong>A scarier possibility is they see volatility suppression as the least worst of a very bad set of policy options.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br />There is also another, even more sinister, possibility. The book states, &ldquo;Those that survive [a carry crash] are almost always insiders with enough political and financial clout to either influence government policy or react very quickly to it.&rdquo; In other words, it is entirely conceivable that government officials are facilitating the current carry regime for political purposes: Energize a system that is doomed to failure, and when it does fail, selectively offer support only to political allies.<br />&nbsp;<br />This scenario could explain why Scott Bessent reached out to Argentina with an offer of financial support despite there being no clear public policy benefit for doing so. Not only does it help a personal friend of Bessent&rsquo;s who had invested large sums in Argentina, but it also sends a broader message to the world: &ldquo;If you are with us, you are eligible for a lifeline. If you are against us, you are on your own and life will be 'nasty, brutish, and short'.&rdquo; In other words, the carry trade may be just one more vehicle by which the Trump administration imposes its influence.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>Conclusion </strong><br />In sum, while there is always a wide range of factors that determine market outcomes, there is a fair amount of evidence that a broadening carry trade is influencing recent activity.<br />&nbsp;<br />Insofar as this is the case, investors get some valuable insight about the nature of the investment proposition. For one, a rising stock market is not necessarily a commentary on improving economic fundamentals. Rather, it is more directly a commentary on declining volatility and increasing leverage.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>In the short-term, this means there is a decent chance stocks will keep going up. However, over the longer-term, there is also a very high chance of a major dislocation.</strong> This is good for short-term risk-takers and not so good for longer-term investors.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>There are also economic and social implications. The longer a carry regime runs, the more misallocation of resources and value destruction there is. This is a better environment for short-term opportunists than for longer-term consumers, workers, or businesspeople.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br />Finally, leverage and proximity to power are key. It&rsquo;s best to be extremely judicious about using leverage. If not, it helps to be well-connected or have friends who are. Otherwise, you&rsquo;re asking for trouble.</font><br /></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Areté market review Q2 25: Ping-pong policy]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q2-25-ping-pong-policy]]></link><comments><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q2-25-ping-pong-policy#comments]]></comments><pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2025 18:11:13 GMT</pubDate><category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q2-25-ping-pong-policy</guid><description><![CDATA[       by David Robertson, CFAJuly 2025Stocks rose over 10% through the quarter finishing at new all-time highs and the benchmark 60/40 balanced fund finished the quarter up over 7%. After "Liberation Day" tariffs liberated investors from a good chunk of their wealth early in the quarter, a pause on the tariffs restored it and the winning ways of stocks continued through quarter-end.&nbsp;The rapid rebound presents investors with a number of questions and challenges though. Was the "Liberation D [...] ]]></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><div class="wsite-image wsite-image-border-none " style="padding-top:10px;padding-bottom:10px;margin-left:0;margin-right:0;text-align:center"> <a> <img src="https://www.areteam.com/uploads/2/2/7/6/22765864/pingpong2_orig.png" alt="Picture" style="width:auto;max-width:100%" /> </a> <div style="display:block;font-size:90%"></div> </div></div>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3">by David Robertson, CFA<br />July 2025<br /><br />Stocks rose over 10% through the quarter finishing at new all-time highs and the benchmark 60/40 balanced fund finished the quarter up over 7%. After "Liberation Day" tariffs liberated investors from a good chunk of their wealth early in the quarter, a pause on the tariffs restored it and the winning ways of stocks continued through quarter-end.<br />&nbsp;<br />The rapid rebound presents investors with a number of questions and challenges though. Was the "Liberation Day" selloff just a blip or was it indicative of more challenges to come? Now that the budget bill has passed, what should investors expect? Will the Trump administration continue to run the economy "hot"?<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>Whirlwind</strong><br />The most prominent phenomenon of the quarter was the continuation of a frenzied media environment. The news was loud, voluminous, often contradictory, and often perplexing. This would have been disorienting enough for investors, but it also coincided with the poor performance of several companies and industries deemed to be beneficiaries of Trump administration policies (e.g., oil and gas). Why didn't these ideas work?<br />&nbsp;<br />The answer has been right in front of our noses: The Trump administration simply has not had the policy space to accomplish many of its campaign promises. The business of government is constrained economically by excessive debt and a large fiscal deficit, and politically by an electorate wholly unwilling to accept the need for sacrifice. This creates a situation conducive to overpromising and underdelivering.<br />&nbsp;<br />This is why politics and the public policy that derives from it were described in the <a href="https://abetterwaytoinvest.substack.com/p/observations-by-david-robertson-1325">January Outlook piece</a> as "key drivers last year" and were expected "to be so again in the new year". The main point is, when underlying economic conditions are not sufficient on their own to comfortably meet people's expectations, story-telling and narrative formation are cheap and easy tools to keep sentiment from spinning out of control.<br />&nbsp;<br />This framework also applies more broadly to geopolitics. Other large economies face similar economic constraints and therefore are also experiencing similar political phenomena. In addition, large, powerful countries always have the additional option of imposing their will on others as a way to mitigate their own economic constraints. This is why the January Outlook piece also forecasted a geopolitical environment that involved "more conflict around the world".<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>The main point here is to recognize that governments, even those of large, powerful countries like the US, have less agency than many investors assume. They can't do just whatever they want. Every policy choice comes with consequences. </strong><br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>A different perspective</strong><br />This reality suggests a different framework for evaluating the impact on the investment environment. Trying to guess specific policies per se is always a crapshoot; the odds are not good because there are so many possibilities. However, when policy constraints are severe, there is much less room for maneuver and therefore fewer realistic options to choose from.<br />&nbsp;<br />The exercise can be likened to card counting. Even though you don't know what cards will come out or in what order, after a number of cards are dealt, you can start getting a sense of whether your odds are better than usual, worse than usual, or about the same.<br />&nbsp;<br />Likewise, in the economic "card game", excessive debt significantly reduces an economy's capacity to grow. This was the seminal finding of Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff and in their 2011 book, <em>This Time is Different</em>. They found the level of debt/GDP of 90% to be the threshold beyond which debt tended to impinge upon economic growth. With current debt held by the public/GDP at about 100%, the US is obviously clearly beyond that threshold.<br />&nbsp;<br />Perhaps one of the clearest indications excessive debt is constraining public policy has come from the Treasury. When debt grew during the Biden administration, Secretary Yellen decided to alter the issuance schedule in favor of short-term debt for fear inadequate demand for bonds would push yields high enough to cripple the economy. With debt now also growing under the Trump administration, Secretary Bessent has taken a similar tack despite having harshly criticized Yellen at the time.<br />&nbsp;<br />The implication is that excessive debt is constraining policy choices by weighing on longer-term yields. If debt was not a problem, there would be no need for shenanigans with issuance. These are not the types of decisions that are made from a position of strength. Nor are they decisions without consequences.<br />&nbsp;<br />The challenge for the Treasury is now becoming even more immediate with the passage of the budget bill because the debt ceiling is raised. As Treasury replenishes its general account and shifts annual issuance higher, the potential for supply to overwhelm demand and to drive yields higher is clear and present.<br />&nbsp;<br />This quandary is exactly why we have heard mention of several unusual policy options lately. Such options include easing regulations (e.g., the Supplemental Leverage Ratio), continued disproportionate issuance of short-term bills, reducing or even eliminating issuance of 10-year bonds, and re-evaluation of the use of the Fed's balance sheet.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>The main point here is that none of these ideas would be seriously considered on their own merits because each comes with negative consequences. They are only in play because the consequences of higher bond yields would likely be even worse. This is just one example of how excessive debt constrains policy options.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>General implications</strong><br />As public policy constraints become increasingly severe, the tradeoffs become increasingly unattractive and imply heightened risk. This doesn&rsquo;t mean the consequences will be immediate, but it does mean the path forward gets harder.<br />&nbsp;<br />Beyond a certain threshold, the only remaining options all have serious shortcomings. The tradeoffs are between bad and perhaps slightly less bad. At this point, there is no easy, relatively painless way out and the odds of a benign outcome are vanishingly small.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>This is the stage when policymakers are forced to reach into their bag of tricks in order to forestall the consequences that threaten their hold on power. One of the tricks is to buy time, to kick the can down the road. Another is to deploy narratives to deceive and manipulate public opinion. The presence of loud and aggressive politics and policy tradeoffs that sacrifice long-term benefits for short-term continuity are strong indications that policy constraints are biting. </strong><br />&nbsp;<br />The best guide in such an environment is to evaluate policy tradeoffs for indications of how much room is left for maneuver. The less room there is, the more imminent a catalyzing event.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>Portfolio implications</strong><br />To be sure, the Trump administration inherited a government beset by a multitude of financial challenges that promised to constrain economic prospects from the start. Now, with a nearly six-month track record to evaluate, investors can start to make some judgments about policy decisions, tradeoffs, and what they mean for investors.<br />&nbsp;<br />For starters, the broad pattern of Trump administration policies to date reflects little desire to fix economic problems. The massive expansion of debt in the new budget bill, Treasury debt management practices that favor short-term debt, the pattern of disinvestment in health, science, and education, and a thuggish approach to international relations all more closely resemble a political project than an effort of responsible governance.<br />&nbsp;<br />One of the indications Trump administration policies are failing to strengthen the US economy is the weakness of the US dollar. <strong>A weak dollar undermines consumer purchasing power and therefore dampens real investment returns. In addition, since US stocks and bonds comprise a majority of most portfolios, long-term investors should be especially diligent about managing this risk. </strong><br />&nbsp;<br />The persistent use of loud and aggressive politics by the Trump administration also has implications for investors. Some of the policy narratives portray economic conditions as better than they are. Others fantasize about an impossibly idyllic future. Still others criticize those with different political beliefs.&nbsp;Many of the statements are simply designed to deflect and avoid criticism.<br />&nbsp;<br />If one takes just a step or two back in order to gain perspective, it&rsquo;s easy to see that none of these applications of narrative are designed to solve problems. Rather, they are all designed to consolidate power. <strong>One of the ways in which this is accomplished is by</strong> <strong>instilling enough uncertainty and doubt so as to inhibit investors from making big changes to spending habits or investment decisions. The resultant &ldquo;non-action&rdquo; serves as an implicit endorsement that buys more time, but at the expense of a more severe reckoning in the future.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br />One last portfolio implication is that in a highly politicized investment landscape, with a highly capricious president, the proposition of short selling is especially challenging. Yes, excessive debt does constrain policy in important ways. <strong>That said, on few issues has Trump proven to be a reliable or consistent advocate. It is not at all unusual for him to make quick U-turns &ndash; and that puts a lot of bets at risk.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />As public policy has become a progressively greater influence on the investment landscape, it is natural to look for clues as to which direction it is tilting. While investing on the basis of public policy <em>wishes</em> has been understandable, it has mainly failed because of the constraints that financial burdens impose on policy. Instead, a more fruitful approach is to identify the degree to which financial burdens constrain policy and then explore the types of tradeoffs that are forced.<br />&nbsp;<br />Given the existing constraints on the Trump administration, there is virtually no chance of realizing strong economic growth without substantial public policy support. Further, with excessive debt and high deficits, there is only very limited room for policy support. Anything that is done will come with negative consequences down the line.<br />&nbsp;<br />Under such conditions, one policy option is to run the economy &ldquo;hot&rdquo;. Though not especially intuitive, it is the course suggested by the massive spending increases in the newly passed budget bill. This will further consume limited national resources but will likely forestall a painful recession for some period of time. It runs the risk of running too hot and triggering inflation.<br />&nbsp;<br />Another option is to run the economy &ldquo;cold&rdquo;. This involves paring back on policy support of markets and allowing growth to slow. Think back to late March when the Trump administration suggested a &ldquo;detox&rdquo; period was needed and then introduced a massive array of tariffs in early April. This runs the risk of initiating an uncontrollable selloff.<br />&nbsp;<br />Finally, a third possible option is to run hot, then cold, then hot, then cold, etc. It can be thought of as &ldquo;ping-pong&rdquo; policy. This involves running the &ldquo;hot&rdquo; playbook until inflation and/or bond yields get too high and then switching to the &ldquo;cold&rdquo; playbook until bond yields recede and recession risk gets too high. Rinse and repeat.<br />&nbsp;<br />This option has the benefit of preventing consumers, businesses and investors from gaining enough confidence in the economic trajectory to significantly alter spending or investment patterns. As a result, it also extends the useful life of each playbook on its own and buys more time.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>What isn&rsquo;t uncertain in any of this is that government debt at current levels severely constrains the space for public policy. The next time government will need to come to the rescue, whether for recession, war, a big bank bailout, or some other emergency, it will thrust government finances into crisis. When that happens, government will come for investors because there won&rsquo;t be other viable options. Perhaps this knowledge will help some investors to seek shelter before it&rsquo;s too late.</strong></font><br /></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Areté market review Q1 25]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q1-25]]></link><comments><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q1-25#comments]]></comments><pubDate>Mon, 05 May 2025 12:10:49 GMT</pubDate><category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q1-25</guid><description><![CDATA[by David Robertson, CFAMay 2025Both the S&amp;P 500 and VBIAX balanced fund ETF rose gently early in the quarter and then dove sharply beginning in mid-February. Total return for the S&amp;P 500 finished down 4.3% and the balanced fund finished down 1.8%. Travails continued into April with much higher volatility being the key feature.While investors should expect a few bumps here and there, the new Trump administration bolted out of the gates with policies that have changed the political, econom [...] ]]></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="paragraph"><font size="3">by David Robertson, CFA<br />May 2025<br /><br />Both the S&amp;P 500 and VBIAX balanced fund ETF rose gently early in the quarter and then dove sharply beginning in mid-February. Total return for the S&amp;P 500 finished down 4.3% and the balanced fund finished down 1.8%. Travails continued into April with much higher volatility being the key feature.<br /><br />While investors should expect a few bumps here and there, the new Trump administration bolted out of the gates with policies that have changed the political, economic, and financial landscape. We definitely are not in Kansas any more. How should investors interpret the changes?<br /><br /><strong>Making the grade</strong><br />Amidst the market and policy volatility of the first quarter (and through April as well), it's easy to get sucked into the riptides of daily news headlines. After the first 100 days of the Trump administration, though, grades are rolling in so we can start to make some assessments. For example, <a href="https://www.thebulwark.com/p/why-trump-sinking-poll-numbers-matter-unpopularity-india-pakistan-kashmir-canada-election">The Bulwark ($)</a> reports:</font></div>  <blockquote><font size="3">CNN, in the field April 17&ndash;24, <a href="https://substack.com/redirect/3da49b16-badb-4c9c-9bb8-ff602316938c?j=eyJ1IjoiMTQwcWgifQ.8ljPnMgpsSHfaqVrJl8XN-bJtQfRkVQoUAj82Yq0ou8">has Trump</a> with a 41 percent job approval rating&mdash;down 7 percentage points over the last two months&mdash;and a 59 percent disapproval rating. Only 22 percent of respondents &ldquo;strongly&rdquo;&nbsp; approve of his performance while 45 percent &ldquo;strongly&rdquo; disapprove.<br />&#8203;<br />The numbers are pretty striking. And what&rsquo;s also striking is that support for Trump&rsquo;s performance on a wide range of issues has declined across the board. Obviously, he&rsquo;s stronger on some issues than others&mdash;but on all of them, he&rsquo;s trending down. This kind of broad disapproval is harder to reverse than if there were simply just one issue harming his presidency, on which he could presumably change course.</font></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3"><a href="https://brucemehlman.substack.com/p/six-chart-sunday-the-next-hundred">Bruce Mehlman highlights</a> an interesting quirk in these data, however. In the survey data he reviews he finds <strong>&ldquo;the Trump Administration often seems to have the right goals but consistently disappointing means for achieving them.&rdquo; He concludes,</strong> &ldquo;<strong><em>The Administration is doing what a majority thinks is right, but in a way that a majority thinks is wrong</em></strong>&hellip;&rdquo;<br /><br />&#8203;He presents DOGE as an example:</font></div>  <div><div class="wsite-image wsite-image-border-none " style="padding-top:10px;padding-bottom:10px;margin-left:0;margin-right:0;text-align:center"> <a> <img src="https://www.areteam.com/uploads/2/2/7/6/22765864/g1-20250502-doge_orig.png" alt="Picture" style="width:auto;max-width:100%" /> </a> <div style="display:block;font-size:90%"></div> </div></div>  <div class="paragraph">&#8203;<font size="3">A similarly differentiated opinion between goal and execution exists with immigration. <a href="https://www.thebulwark.com/p/100-days-in-mass-deportation-is-a-failure-fishy-statistics-poll-numbers-incompetent-focus-donald-trump-voters-group">The Bulwark ($) also reports</a> a Reuters/Ipsos <a href="https://substack.com/redirect/6b414876-a482-49a6-bd93-600fe88dd51c?j=eyJ1IjoiMTQwcWgifQ.8ljPnMgpsSHfaqVrJl8XN-bJtQfRkVQoUAj82Yq0ou8">poll</a> found &ldquo;that 50 percent of respondents believed Kilmar Abrego Garcia, who was wrongly deported to El Salvador, should be returned to the United States while only 28 percent said he shouldn&rsquo;t be.&rdquo; <strong>In short, &ldquo;People want immigration to be quote-unquote &lsquo;handled&rsquo; but they want it to be done in a way that fits with their idea of the American justice system.&rdquo;<br /></strong><br />In short, the verdict so far is that the Trump administration is properly identifying important political hot buttons, but it is not executing well on them.<br /><br />This curiosity is worth exploring. Why does the differential between goal and implementation exist and how confident should investors and voters be that it resolves favorably?<br /><br />One possible reason for the performance shortfall is the Trump administration does not have a good handle on what it takes to actually solve the problems it has targeted and/or has not properly considered the consequences. Clearly, policy moves have come fast and furious, but so too have the negative consequences.<br /><br />Massive, and arguably reckless, cuts by DOGE have crippled fruitful programs while providing little verifiable benefit. Substantial, across-the-board increases in tariffs have shaken confidence in global supply chains and driven up expectations of inflation, but show little promise of resetting persistent trade imbalances.<br /><br />While it is too early to pass definitive judgment on these initiatives, the signs are not good. Rapidly declining poll results indicate the Trump administration is not adequately serving voters. Rapidly declining economic results suggest its policies for boosting the economy are also failing.<br /><br />Another possible reason for the performance shortfall is intent. It is possible the Trump administration is not guided primarily by the intent to achieve better outcomes for the American people. By this hypothesis, the Trump administration has its own agenda which is different than governing. Its policies are designed to pursue that agenda, but in a way that may only tangentially address political concerns.<br /><br />This would explain DOGE cuts that eliminated programs that were clearly beneficial and often seemed more targeted at political retribution than at meaningful cost savings. It also explains the refusal of the administration to redress the admitted violation of due process in regard to Kilmar Abrego Garcia. If the Trump administration were truly compelled to serve the American people, it would be doing a lot of things differently.<br /><br />It is true the Trump administration has made concessions and course corrected, most notably in regard to tariffs. As such, it may indicate some capacity to evolve and adapt to the political environment. But the &ldquo;Liberation Day&rdquo; tariff announcements surprised the market and threatened to cause a catastrophic dislocation. It&rsquo;s easier to characterize the administration&rsquo;s deferral of tariffs as a last-ditch effort to avoid disaster than as an operational norm, however.<br /><br />Interestingly, these evaluations are remarkably similar to those generated by ChatGPT 4o when prompted to evaluate Trump administration policies through the framework of POSIWID (the Purpose Of a System Is What It Does). <strong>On economics, ChatGPT assesses: &ldquo;The outcomes indicate that the administration's protectionist policies have led to economic instability, challenging the narrative of promoting economic growth.&rdquo; In regard to civil liberties, it finds: &ldquo;These actions suggest an underlying objective to suppress dissent and control narratives, undermining principles of free speech and press freedom.&rdquo; The common theme is disruption, without improvement.<br /></strong><br /><strong>China Syndrome</strong><br />While the Trump administration is making its influence felt through countless executive orders and domestic policies, the single issue that matters most is China. As Russell Napier makes clear in his latest Solid Ground ($) newsletter, the foremost global problem is the excessive debt burden of the world's largest economies. Further, the primary cause of that excessive debt can be traced back to financial and economic imbalances with China.<br /><br />It's not just debt, per se, that is the problem, but rather the mechanics behind its continued and unsustainable growth, i.e., the fiscal deficit. The problem originates in China where workers do not get compensated adequately for their contribution to production. As a result, Chinese workers cannot afford all of the goods China produces and manufacturers have to export excesses abroad.<br /><br />By virtue of its reserve currency status, the US ends up absorbing a disproportionate share of these Chinese manufacturing excesses. That leaves the country with the unfortunate choice of either suffering higher unemployment or enduring ever-higher levels of debt. For years, rising debt wasn&rsquo;t a huge problem. Now it is.<br /><br />One thing to understand about this situation is it has been going on for decades. China chose a model to grow fast at the expense of other economies, it massively ramped up that model, and now it is so big and causing so many problems for other economies that something has to change. <strong>The imbalances created by this process have not been modest cyclical ones, but rather major structural ones.<br /></strong><br />Another thing to understand is that China has a large, powerful, interconnected economy and a growing military capacity. As such, it has a great deal of ability to leverage those strengths in order to achieve its own objectives and can be expected to do so.<br /><br />Both the US and China also have their own set of economic and geopolitical constraints. <strong>Vested interests in both countries grew powerful under an expanded global trade system and can be expected to resist any changes to that system, regardless of public policy.<br /></strong><br />Given these conditions, one thing that becomes obvious is there is no easy answer to resolve the imbalances between the two countries. Even if both governments wanted to, there would still be significant resistance. <strong>Any belief that these problems can be dispensed with quickly as the result of a &ldquo;deal&rdquo; indicates a major misunderstanding of the nature of the challenge.<br /></strong><br />As a result, the baseline expectation for relations between the US and China should revolve around a protracted struggle between two superpowers. This contest could evolve in a number of ways including an extended cold war or even a hot war, but is highly unlikely to resolve quickly or painlessly.<br /><br /><strong>Progress report</strong><br />With that characterization, how is the Trump administration performing on China, the single most important issue for the country?<br /><br />Interestingly, David Autor, the MIT economist, arrives at an evaluation of Trump administration performance on China that is remarkably similar to Bruce Mehlman&rsquo;s evaluation on domestic policy issues.<br /><br />According to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/economy/archive/2025/04/trump-china-shock-manufacturing/682631/">the Atlantic ($)</a>, Autor shares the view of the Trump administration that &ldquo;Free trade with China has been a disaster for the American worker, and we need tariffs to reverse the damage.&rdquo;<br /><br />However, Autor also finds the execution on the issue to be wanting:</font></div>  <blockquote><font size="3">&#8203;he also believes that Trump&mdash;who has imposed sweeping 145 percent tariffs on nearly all Chinese imports, and who seems to announce or walk back some new trade policy at least once a week&mdash;is challenging that consensus in the most counterproductive way possible.&nbsp;</font></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph">&#8203;<font size="3"><strong>In words that clearly echo those of Mehlman, Autor concludes, &ldquo;I think the Trump folks are asking the right question. But they&rsquo;ve come up with just about the worst answer.&rdquo;<br /></strong><br /><strong>Something&rsquo;s gotta give</strong><br />What should investors make of all this?<br /><br />For starters, in an environment in which the financial and economic landscape is enormously influenced by politics and public policy, and in which assessments of politics are frequently biased, it&rsquo;s good to be aware of the biases that exist on both sides. <a href="https://brucemehlman.substack.com/p/six-chart-sunday-where-you-sit-is">Bruce Mehlman provides</a> some good advice:</font></div>  <blockquote><font size="3">&#8203;Analysts need to resist personal bias in their assessments. Trump detractors may mistakenly think that the President shares their conviction that he&rsquo;s failing (he doesn&rsquo;t) and give up on policies they don&rsquo;t like (he won&rsquo;t). Supporters may mistake objective market signals for partisan criticism, missing critical signals amidst the noise.</font></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3">That said, while it is still early in the administration, it&rsquo;s been long enough to identify some important patterns. <strong>Across multiple dimensions, the Trump administration is not making things better. Further, in many cases it is making things worse. It doesn&rsquo;t help much to investigate the causes. It&rsquo;s enough to know that falling poll numbers and weakening economic results say existing policies are not working.<br /></strong><br />This reality co-exists awkwardly with two others. <strong>One is that time is running out.</strong> The fiscal deficit is unsustainably high and budget discussions to date come nowhere near resolving them. <strong>Another is that markets are still working on an extremely sunny set of assumptions.</strong> Foremost among those is the assumption that policymakers will save investors from experiencing significant pain.<br /><br />This setup establishes an extremely unattractive risk/reward tradeoff for investors in US financial assets. About the best that can be expected is the administration reverses harmful policies, business resumes as if &ldquo;Liberation Day&rdquo; never happened, China inexplicably acquiesces completely, and all is forgiven and forgotten. In this case stocks remain about the same because all of this is already priced in. Based on the evidence, this is a low probability scenario.<br /><br />A middle path involves business conditions that continue to weaken. Persistently adverse conditions are attenuated by intermittent policy interventions. This avoids a market crash, but ultimately manifests in a lower steady-state stream of cash flows. Through a relatively long adjustment process, stock valuations reset to new, lower levels.<br /><br />The worst case starts down the middle path, but inflects downward when something breaks, when unintended consequences manifest, when geopolitical brinkmanship escalates, or when some other surprise crops up for which known policy responses are ineffective. Recent weakness in the US dollar and jumps in Treasury bond yields indicate some investors are beginning to seriously consider such a possibility.<br /><br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />For long-term investors, the implications are straightforward. <strong>This is an unusually hostile environment for risk assets. If you are not extremely comfortable with your level of risk exposure, you need to act NOW. If you are comfortable, and have a fair amount of liquid assets, you can start war-gaming the types and amounts of risk you might want to add at much lower prices in the not-too-distant future.&nbsp;</strong>&#8203;</font></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Areté market review Q4 24]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q4-24]]></link><comments><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q4-24#comments]]></comments><pubDate>Tue, 28 Jan 2025 12:59:39 GMT</pubDate><category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q4-24</guid><description><![CDATA[by David Robertson, CFAJanuary 2025&#8203;After posting a pretty good run through November, stocks hit a bumpy patch late in the year, but still finished the quarter up 2.4%. The return of the Vanguard 60/40 portfolio (VBIAX) was just 0.43% which was less than the return on cash.&nbsp;Looking forward, all eyes are on the Trump administration, the policies that emerge from it, and the effects those policies will have on the investment landscape. Will Trump's policies reinvigorate growth? Can stoc [...] ]]></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="paragraph"><font size="3">by David Robertson, CFA<br />January 2025<br /><br />&#8203;After posting a pretty good run through November, stocks hit a bumpy patch late in the year, but still finished the quarter up 2.4%. The return of the Vanguard 60/40 portfolio (VBIAX) was just 0.43% which was less than the return on cash.<br />&nbsp;<br />Looking forward, all eyes are on the Trump administration, the policies that emerge from it, and the effects those policies will have on the investment landscape. Will Trump's policies reinvigorate growth? Can stocks keep running? Will inflation reaccelerate?<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>A different tack</strong><br />While it is natural to be hopeful for progress, it is also important for investors to objectively assess the landscape. Are things likely to be better, worse, or stay about the same?<br />&nbsp;<br />This task is currently complicated by two important phenomena. One is that political partisanship is significantly biasing perceptions of financial and economic data. Another is that investors are being absolutely flooded with news and policy ideas. It&rsquo;s hard to keep everything straight, let alone develop a cohesive thesis.<br />&nbsp;<br />As a result, it is interesting to try a different tack. Rather than consider what <em>could</em> possibly happen, let&rsquo;s consider what is likely to NOT happen.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>What have we learned?</strong><br />Fortunately, we have a relatively recent, instructive example. As <a href="https://abetterwaytoinvest.substack.com/p/observations-by-david-robertson-12425">I described in Observations</a> last week regarding bond yields during the Covid crisis:</font>&#8203;</div>  <blockquote><font size="3">For example, in 2021, investors assumed interest rates would remain low. That assumption was based on past policy tendencies. However, those past policy tendencies were formed in a period of extremely low inflation. In the context of the higher inflation of 2021, there was no longer the luxury of keeping interest rates exceptionally low. Even in 2024, with rates much higher than in 2021, the Biden administration was constrained by the political reality of having to <em>appear</em> to be fighting inflation. What happened was a disaster for bond investors &mdash; <strong>all because the narrative about what could happen with long-term rates changed when inflation arrived.</strong></font></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph">&#8203;<font size="3">This episode reveals an important insight about interest rate narratives at the time. Even as fiscal and monetary policy unleashed massive amounts of stimulus in 2020 and 2021, the dominant narrative was that inflation was "transitory". An important part of this story line was that rates would soon "return to normal," with "normal" meaning the low single digit rates of the post-GFC years.<br />&nbsp;<br />The lesson to be learned is in that moment, bond investors either didn&rsquo;t recognize or didn&rsquo;t fully account for some fundamental changes that were occurring. Changes like how huge fiscal stimulus, combined with numerous supply constraints, could unleash long-dormant inflationary pressures. Changes like the emergence of inflation evoking harsh political backlash that would constrain monetary policy.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>Were there credible arguments for buying bonds in the summer of 2020? Of course! But with yields at historic lows and plausible catalysts for changes in key drivers, the risk/reward was awful. In hindsight, it seems obvious.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br />As we consider prospects for financial assets going forward, it is helpful to keep the lessons of this example in mind. Mainly, any expectation of a &ldquo;return to normal&rdquo; should be recalibrated by the degree to which underlying assumptions may have changed.<br />&nbsp;<br />This lesson absolutely applies to stocks today. Mostly, the case for stocks relies on the assumption of a benign environment comparable to that after the GFC. However, that assumption is challenged on many fronts.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>New assumptions</strong><br />For starters, inflation remains a threat today in a way that just didn&rsquo;t exist in the years after the financial crisis. The Covid emergency provided cover for governments to spend freely &ndash; and they did. Spending now remains quite high even without Covid. It wouldn&rsquo;t take much of an economic &ldquo;emergency&rdquo; for spending to ratchet up to even higher levels.<br />&nbsp;<br />Further, just as supply constraints exacerbated pricing pressures during Covid, so too can they exacerbate problems if geopolitical tensions continue to increase.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>In addition, while monetary policy was the name of the game in post-GFC years, the room for maneuver has diminished considerably.</strong> The emergence of inflation, and the intense political backlash against it, forces the Fed to be considerably more cautious about cutting rates. Further, the practice of Quantitative Easing (QE) was found to increase inequality which imbued it with a stigma that is likely to significantly restrict its use in the future.<br />&nbsp;<br />Nor is it just monetary policy that is increasingly constrained. The anti-incumbency trend <a href="https://abetterwaytoinvest.substack.com/p/observations-by-david-robertson-11824">I noted in Observations</a> last year is restricting democratic governments around the world.<br />In the US, a large budget deficit, excessive debt, and no tolerance for inflation, suggest the Trump administration has a very narrow path to walk on public policy.<br />&nbsp;<br />Further, while Republicans currently appear to have significant control over policy direction in the US, that appearance is deceiving. While rhetoric for change is strong, as <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6c2f4485-b4ac-4cb0-b3f7-dac55b04d685">James Politi reports in the FT ($)</a>, there are multiple threats to cohesion with the party:&nbsp;</font></div>  <blockquote><font size="3">&#8203;While the incoming president enjoys stronger standing with the American public than at almost any time during his first term, he also has a much more diverse political coalition to satisfy.<br />&nbsp;<br />&ldquo;I&rsquo;m not sure that he will actually be stronger institutionally once he&rsquo;s in office,&rdquo; says Lindsay Chervinsky, a political historian and executive director of the George Washington Presidential Library. &ldquo;There are so many issues that people [in his camp] are going to be fundamentally and intractably in disagreement on.&rdquo;<br />&nbsp;<br />There&rsquo;s already clear faultlines,&rdquo; he says &ldquo;To continue to expand and grow, populism has to deliver results. And that doesn&rsquo;t mean tax cuts for the wealthy, it means tax cuts for the little guy.&rdquo;</font>&nbsp;</blockquote>  <div class="paragraph">&#8203;<font size="3"><strong>The combination of &ldquo;clear faultlines&rdquo; hindering the Republican agenda and sharp political divisions remaining across the country provide a starkly different environment than FDR had with his first 100 days of historic policymaking.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br />Frictions are also increasing abroad as well as at home. Several countries, including China, have developed much greater concerns about investing in the US. With the election of Trump, those concerns have expanded to America's allies as well. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/86c5adf3-0178-423b-9d00-2af9aaec14a8">Martin Wolf in the FT ($)</a> describes:</font></div>  <blockquote><font size="3">&#8203;How does the world view this event [Trump&rsquo;s election]? In &ldquo;Alone in a Trumpian World&rdquo;, the European Council on Foreign Relations has just published the results of surveys of public opinion across the world. They are fascinating. The people most disturbed by Trump&rsquo;s second coming are citizens of its closest allies. Only 22 per cent of citizens of the EU, 15 per cent of the British and 11 per cent of South Koreans think his return is a good thing for their country. Meanwhile, 84 per cent of Indians, 61 per cent of the people of Saudi Arabia, 49 per cent of Russians and 46 per cent of the Chinese think it is good for their country.&nbsp;</font></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph">&#8203;<font size="3">In short, geopolitical friends and adversaries alike have a waning interest in supporting US policy and, by extension, capital markets. Worse yet, as many of those countries confront economic challenges of their own, they will have significant incentives to act in their own interest, even if that comes at the expense of the US. Meanwhile, adversaries will be on the lookout for opportunities to cause disruption.<br />&nbsp;<br />Summing up, when all of the major constraints are taken into consideration, two things become clear. <strong>One is that many of the key assumptions investors have used to build up narratives for stocks are no longer valid, at least not nearly to the same degree. Another is there are only a limited number of ways forward for policy measures; there are too many constraints for a wide open playbook. </strong><br />&nbsp;<br />The good news is the path ahead is far less unpredictable, at least in broad strokes, than we might imagine. This establishes some useful clarity: <strong>While new policies could possibly lead to significant improvement in the investment landscape, and we should all be hopeful for that, the odds are strongly against it.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>This isn&rsquo;t normal</strong><br />Another assumption that should be scrutinized is what constitutes &ldquo;normal&rdquo;. Whether it be in regard to inflation, American exceptionalism, or other phenomena, the default forecast is often a return to &ldquo;normal&rdquo;.<br />&nbsp;<br />As the graph below from The Daily Shot indicates, however, US bond yields have definitely NOT been normal for most of the last thirty years. Not only did 10-year yields fall persistently over most of the period shown, but they hit an all-time low in 2020. Further, those yields were also well below the modeled rate which is a good proxy for a &ldquo;fair value&rdquo; rate.&nbsp;</font></div>  <div><div class="wsite-image wsite-image-border-none " style="padding-top:10px;padding-bottom:10px;margin-left:0;margin-right:0;text-align:center"> <a> <img src="https://www.areteam.com/uploads/2/2/7/6/22765864/20250128-10yr_orig.png" alt="Picture" style="width:auto;max-width:100%" /> </a> <div style="display:block;font-size:90%"></div> </div></div>  <div class="paragraph">&#8203;<font size="3">The graph also suggests why this was the case: Prices, and therefore yields, were set by buyers who didn&rsquo;t care about price; they had other objectives. First China in the late 1990s through the GFC, then the Federal Reserve from the GFC through the pandemic, with a brief respite just before the pandemic.<br />&nbsp;<br />One may argue, so what? As long as large government authorities want something to happen, such as long-term interest rates to be below &ldquo;fair value&rdquo; rates, who is to stop them? Fair question, but as discussed previously, monetary, economic, political, and geopolitical conditions are all imposing new constraints on policy actions. <strong>The government simply does not have the same capacity to coddle owners of financial assets as it has had in the past.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br />So, a return to the old sense of &ldquo;normal&rdquo; is extremely unlikely. That means investors will need to figure out what the new notion of &ldquo;normal&rdquo; looks like.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>Implications</strong><br />There are a lot of reasons why bond investors have suffered so much over the last four years. Partly there was greed and partly there was a lack of historic perspective. <strong>Mainly, however, the slowness to appreciate that underlying assumptions had changed materially and the misguided baseline for normalcy were the key mistakes.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br />These same keys apply today to investors in stocks and other risk assets. The benign conditions of the past are under threat on many fronts. As a result, it is no longer a safe assumption that inflation will remain low, that central bankers will protect the downside, or that the political environment will favor the stock market. Indeed, we may have gotten a good preview this week of how narratives can break down and send stocks reeling with the disruption to the entire artificial intelligence space by DeepSeek.<br />&nbsp;<br />While the longer-term prognosis is negative for stocks, that doesn&rsquo;t necessarily imply there will be a crash. For one, there are strong policy incentives to maintain stability and prevent disruption. For another, the positive narratives around stocks are so strong, they will take a long time to completely break down. This may very well provide tradeable opportunities along the way. <strong>Make no mistake, however, the longer-term risk/reward for stocks is awful and there is very long way to fall for current narratives.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br />Finally, none of this suggests a doomsday scenario. The US has more resources and more policy levers than most countries, even if they are much more limited than in the past. That should allow the economy to remain in decent shape, even if financial assets get hit.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />As investors scramble to make sense of the investment environment under a new president and new policies, it&rsquo;s easy to get overwhelmed by the sheer volume of news and ideas. One way to overcome the challenge is to reframe the effort by considering the constraints on policy, i.e., by considering what is unlikely to happen. This helps filter out a lot of noise.<br />&nbsp;<br />Doing so highlights the fact that there are some intractable problems in an environment of unforgiving politics. Stocks are near all-time high valuations and many of the benign conditions of the past are fading away. This makes the risk/reward proposition for stocks truly terrible over a longer horizon like ten years.<br />&nbsp;<br />Of course, there is nothing wrong with optimism and there are certainly situations where optimism can create its own opportunities. <strong>But there is something wrong with overly optimistic sentiments that overwhelm objectively bad risks. Bond investors have learned this lesson over the last three and a half three years. Stock investors are up next. Plan accordingly.</strong></font><br /></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Areté market review Q3 24: Happy endings?]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q3-24-happy-endings]]></link><comments><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q3-24-happy-endings#comments]]></comments><pubDate>Mon, 07 Oct 2024 12:01:59 GMT</pubDate><category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q3-24-happy-endings</guid><description><![CDATA[by David Robertson CFAOctober 2024&#8203;Stocks posted another good quarter with the S&amp;P 500 up 5.89% (total return). Bonds also posted a strong total return with the TLT bond ETF up 7.93% in the quarter. It was enough to make investors feel all warm and fuzzy inside.&nbsp;Clearly, the Fed was a key component to the mood music. Anticipation of a rate cut, and then final implementation of the cut, drove positive sentiment through the quarter. With that big policy threshold crossed, the questi [...] ]]></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="paragraph"><font size="3">by David Robertson CFA<br />October 2024<br /><br />&#8203;Stocks posted another good quarter with the S&amp;P 500 up 5.89% (total return). Bonds also posted a strong total return with the TLT bond ETF up 7.93% in the quarter. It was enough to make investors feel all warm and fuzzy inside.<br />&nbsp;<br />Clearly, the Fed was a key component to the mood music. Anticipation of a rate cut, and then final implementation of the cut, drove positive sentiment through the quarter. With that big policy threshold crossed, the question now is how does the story end?<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>A nice story</strong><br />To be sure, the Fed has had an accommodating audience in that market participants have bought the Fed's narrative of a "soft landing" hook, line and sinker. <strong>If there is one element that stands out in regard to the investment landscape, it is the high degree of certainty with which investors believe conditions are favorable.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br />This high degree of certainty is reflected a number of ways. For example, <a href="https://x.com/KobeissiLetter/status/1841520686084325667">The Kobeissi Letter shows</a> "Bullish sentiment is through the roof: US equity futures positioning by investors excluding market-makers just hit a net long of ~$290 billion, the most on record.&rdquo;</font></div>  <div><div class="wsite-image wsite-image-border-none " style="padding-top:10px;padding-bottom:10px;margin-left:0;margin-right:0;text-align:center"> <a> <img src="https://www.areteam.com/uploads/2/2/7/6/22765864/aq3-2024q3-equityfutures_orig.png" alt="Picture" style="width:auto;max-width:100%" /> </a> <div style="display:block;font-size:90%"></div> </div></div>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3">&#8203;The bullishness has also extended to bonds. <a href="https://x.com/biancoresearch/status/1839677118101274935">Jim Bianco points out</a> "In the last half-century, 'civilians' have never been this bullish on the bond market."</font></div>  <div><div class="wsite-image wsite-image-border-none " style="padding-top:10px;padding-bottom:10px;margin-left:0;margin-right:0;text-align:center"> <a> <img src="https://www.areteam.com/uploads/2/2/7/6/22765864/aq5-2024q3-bianco_orig.png" alt="Picture" style="width:auto;max-width:100%" /> </a> <div style="display:block;font-size:90%"></div> </div></div>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3">&#8203;Of course, there are reasons for this extreme sentiment. Inflation has been quiescent as of late, earnings are growing nicely, bond volatility, in particular, has declined, and monetary policy is easing across the board. It's all very appeasing, like a good bedtime story.<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>Inconvenient truths</strong><br />Bedtime stories have their purpose, but providing clear-eyed, objective investment analysis is not one of them. For better and worse, we don't have to go too far or work too hard to find evidence to seriously challenge the "Goldilocks" view of investment conditions.<br />&nbsp;<br />Let's start with inflation. While reported numbers are coming in close to the Fed's targets, they aren't there yet. Further, an easy case can be made that inflation is turning higher. As <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b57f8e66-71c7-4a3e-8dc9-1e2f8a4d7e2b">Robert Armstrong reported for the FT ($)</a>, "<strong>We like to look at the month-to-month change in core inflation and annualise it ... That figure has now risen smartly for two months in a row.</strong>"&nbsp;<br />&nbsp;<br />In addition, <a href="https://theovershoot.co/p/us-inflation-is-still-hotter-than">Matt Klein ($) shows</a> "Inflation Is Still Hotter than Pre-Pandemic". He highlights that not only is inflation not falling any longer, but it is still noticeably above target. While he does not purport this to be a huge problem necessarily, he notes. "it is worth bearing in mind when thinking about where interest rates might end up once the Fed finishes its 'recalibration'." <strong>In short, the so-called "neutral" rate may be a fair bit higher than before the pandemic</strong>.<br />&nbsp;<br />Finally, while most attention is placed on demand as the most likely cause of inflation, supply constraints are every bit as much of a threat. Geopolitical conflict, weather events, and labor strikes can all visibly cause supply disruptions. Further, long-term underinvestment in infrastructure and commodity production also present challenges &ndash; and challenges that cannot be resolved quickly.<br />&nbsp;<br />Indications the placid demeanor of the market may be misplaced come from abroad as well. While China has made news recently with its policy stimulus and soaring stock market, Michael Pettis establishes some valuable perspective: Policy provisions to date do not address fundamental deflationary pressures.<br />&nbsp;<br /><a href="https://x.com/michaelxpettis/status/1839887352556036174">He highlights</a>, "What Caixin doesn't say is that the need to turn these empty apartments into cash as soon as possible can't help but put further downward pressure on apartment prices in the near term." <a href="https://x.com/BobEUnlimited/status/1840702444864496071">Bob Elliott adds</a>, "So the primary initial macroeconomic focus area is arresting the acute property price declines".<br />&nbsp;<br />This is a key point. Property price declines have not stopped yet, nor has associated bad debt been dealt with. <strong>As a result, the baseline condition in China is still deflation. <a href="https://x.com/BobEUnlimited/status/1840706765005943288">Elliott concludes</a>, "For a global macro investor, the CHN *economy* matters a lot more." So, China remains a threat to global growth.</strong><br />&nbsp;<br />Not to be outdone, Japan also needs to be considered for its potential to upset markets. <a href="https://x.com/chigrl/status/1841429596765352073">Tracy Shuchart posts</a> a good overview of the situation:</font></div>  <blockquote><font size="3">&#8203;<strong>Japan&rsquo;s $4 Trillion &lsquo;Carry Trade&rsquo; Begins to Slowly Unwind </strong><br />&nbsp;<br />Japan&rsquo;s investors are starting to lose their decades-long infatuation with overseas assets.<br />&nbsp;<br />In the first eight months of the year, Japanese investors snapped up a net &yen;28 trillion ($192 billion) of the nation&rsquo;s government bonds, the largest amount for the time frame in at least 14 years. They also cut purchases of foreign bonds by almost half to just &yen;7.7 trillion and their buying of overseas equities was less than &yen;1 trillion.<br />&nbsp;<br />&ldquo;It&rsquo;s going to be one of the mega trends and it is a super cycle for the next five to 10 years,&rdquo; said Arif Husain, head of fixed-income at T. Rowe Price, who has nearly three decades of investing experience. &ldquo;There will be a sustained, gradual but massive flow of capital back into Japan from abroad.&rdquo;<br />&nbsp;<br />With $4.4 trillion invested abroad, an amount larger than India&rsquo;s economy, the speed and size of any pullback has the power to disrupt global markets. Even as the gap in rates between Japan and other countries has narrowed, the inflows have been a trickle rather than the flood some investors have feared.</font></blockquote>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3">&#8203;Since the US stock and bond market has been a primary destination for Japanese capital, it is fair to expect "a sustained, gradual but massive flow of capital back into Japan" from those markets.<br />&nbsp;<br />Switching back to the subject of bedtime stories, one of the more notable patterns over time is that of the political economy. Incumbent administrations have every incentive in the world to try to boost the economy in front of an election. That involves real decisions to direct spending within its authority, but it also involves the formation of a narrative to "explain" to people what the data mean.<br />&nbsp;<br />At the present time, the combination of improving economic growth (from The Daily Shot)</font></div>  <div><div class="wsite-image wsite-image-border-none " style="padding-top:10px;padding-bottom:10px;margin-left:0;margin-right:0;text-align:center"> <a> <img src="https://www.areteam.com/uploads/2/2/7/6/22765864/aq2-2024q3-citi_orig.png" alt="Picture" style="width:auto;max-width:100%" /> </a> <div style="display:block;font-size:90%"></div> </div></div>  <div class="paragraph">&#8203;<font size="3">and a notable decline in one of the most visible indicators of inflation, gasoline (Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data),</font></div>  <div><div class="wsite-image wsite-image-border-none " style="padding-top:10px;padding-bottom:10px;margin-left:0;margin-right:0;text-align:center"> <a> <img src="https://www.areteam.com/uploads/2/2/7/6/22765864/aq6-2024q3-gas_orig.png" alt="Picture" style="width:auto;max-width:100%" /> </a> <div style="display:block;font-size:90%"></div> </div></div>  <div class="paragraph"><font size="3">tells a very nice story for the Harris campaign. Perhaps too nice. <strong>Investors should at least consider the possibility that political motives may be at work in regard to both the data we are receiving and the narrative around it.</strong> In short, the picture we are getting right now may not be a very representative one -- and may look quite a bit different in a couple of quarters.<br />&nbsp;<br />Finally, bedtime stories are occasionally dramatized with a big baddie. In financial markets, one of the recurring villains is rates markets, the financial plumbing. Almost on cue, rates markets have begun to wobble again.<br />&nbsp;<br /><a href="https://x.com/ScottSkyrm/status/1841479914714759397">Scott Skyrm exclaims</a>, "So much for the Repo Rate Corridor! There is supposed to be a ceiling and floor on Repo rates that keeps rates within the fed funds target range." <a href="https://x.com/crossbordercap/status/1841805411801772333">CrossBorder Capital</a> also suggests heightened awareness is appropriate: "Last two days have seen #US GC repo and SOFR rates blow out...result our daily market #liquidity measures have skidded lower. Nothing yet, but... lets watch".<br />&nbsp;<br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />The common theme that emerges is there are a lot of ways in which the &ldquo;Goldilocks&rdquo; scenario may fail to materialize. On one hand, conditions may prove less favorable than currently perceived. Inflation may turn out to be more persistent. Various trade frictions could cause supply shortages reminiscent of the pandemic era. China could export deflation to the rest of the world. Japan could repatriate vast amounts of capital at the expense of markets in the US and elsewhere.<br />&nbsp;<br />To the extent these types of issues might undermine the current investment thesis, they would fall under the nugget of wisdom, "It ain&rsquo;t what you don&rsquo;t know that gets you into trouble. It&rsquo;s what you know for sure that just ain&rsquo;t so."<br />&nbsp;<br />On the other hand, it may be that the conviction of investors to seek risk and to make bets subsides. After the election, it may become clear that policies to support capital at the expense of labor will become a political liability. The government may become unable or unwilling to support markets with the same fervor as it has in the past. The Fed may change direction (again) and pause on rate cuts. Perhaps worse, it may become clear the Fed is no longer able to steer markets as it has in the past.<br />&nbsp;<br />Either of these reasons would be sufficient for markets to give up ground and both are quite possible. As a result, investors would do well to treat current market euphoria as a trading opportunity at best. Long-term investors should recognize the current risks and incorporate them into their long-run risk allocations. <strong>Those who luxuriate in the fairly tale stories about markets are most likely to experience unhappy endings.</strong></font>&#8203;</div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Areté market review Q224: The Fed's kaput]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q224-the-feds-kaput]]></link><comments><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q224-the-feds-kaput#comments]]></comments><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jul 2024 12:22:16 GMT</pubDate><category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q224-the-feds-kaput</guid><description><![CDATA[by David Robertson, CFAJuly 2024&#8203;Stocks continued to run in the second quarter with the S&amp;P 500 posting a total return of 4.28% for the second quarter and 15.29% for the first half. After a bit of weakness early in the quarter, it took only a few weeks for stocks to resume their winning ways. Once again, big tech, artificial intelligence, and momentum were leading themes.Another leading theme was the Fed "put", the practice of monetary authorities easing financial conditions when marke [...] ]]></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="paragraph"><font size="3">by David Robertson, CFA<br />July 2024<br /><br />&#8203;Stocks continued to run in the second quarter with the S&amp;P 500 posting a total return of 4.28% for the second quarter and 15.29% for the first half. After a bit of weakness early in the quarter, it took only a few weeks for stocks to resume their winning ways. Once again, big tech, artificial intelligence, and momentum were leading themes.<br /><br />Another leading theme was the Fed "put", the practice of monetary authorities easing financial conditions when markets become turbulent, or even just stagnant. As concerns about growth have been increasing, so too have expectations of market-friendly rate cuts from the Fed also been increasing. The result is, there is almost never an environment that is bad for stocks.<br /><br />Or so the thinking goes. The hard fact of the matter is that the environment in which the Fed operates has changed in many ways &ndash; and in ways that increasingly impose constraints. The bottom line is the inordinate degree of faith investors place in the Fed to ensure favorable market outcomes is becoming increasingly misplaced.<br /><br /><strong>Long live the Fed put<br /></strong><br />To be sure, there are valid reasons for believing in the Fed's support of the market. For starters, there is history. Since the late 1990s, and arguably going back even further, the Fed has made a practice of easing financial conditions whenever turbulence arose. Financial stability has been a priority, and it remains a priority.<br /><br />In addition, the Fed has a more expansive toolkit today than it ever has to deal with a wide variety of financial miscues. The GFC featured Quantitative Easing (QE) which was amped up during the Covid lockdowns. The Fed also made the Standing Repo Facility (SRF) permanent, added the Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP) during the banking crisis in early 2023, and has been working to improve the effectiveness of the Discount Window. All of these serve as important backstops for financial plumbing as well as safety nets for financial markets.<br /><br />Finally, the Fed also recently decided to substantially scale back its Quantitative Tightening (QT) program. After committing to reduce its obscenely bloated balance sheet (from QE) and return to some kind of monetary normalcy, it lost its heart for discipline and caved in. As a result, it is easy to assume the Fed is already on a trajectory of easing again. Rate cuts are just the next logical step.&nbsp;<br /><br /><strong>What has made the Fed put especially potent, however, is the belief system that the Fed not only CAN operate to protect financial markets, but also that it WILL always succeed in boosting them. Some time after the GFC, the Fed put morphed from being a safety net against disruptive dislocations into a guarantee of strong returns. As a result, investors have become habituated to increasingly aggressive intervention.</strong> This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that works as long as investors believe it works. We'll come back to this.<br /><br /><strong>A different point of view<br /></strong><br />Although the Fed still exhibits a tendency of pandering to markets, it doesn't take much imagination to also see how its hand has gotten much weaker.<br /><br />For example, when inflation rose noticeably higher in 2021, the Fed responded by raising rates in 2022. Not only did it raise rates, but it raised them to over five percent. And it has held them at over five percent for over a year. At the same time, it was also reducing its balance sheet through Quantitative Tightening (QT).<br /><br />While there were clearly valid reasons for the Fed to tighten policy at the time, its actions were on the tight side. Interestingly, at the same time, its words were often on the dovish side.<br /><br />Indeed, to the extent actions have induced easier financial conditions, those actions have come from the Treasury, not the Fed. While the two have been working in concert since Covid, it is not a trivial distinction that most of the liquidity provision has come from Treasury in the form of disproportionately high issuance of Treasury bills. Conversely, when the Fed did provide liquidity to banks in early 2023, the provision was limited in both scope and duration.<br /><br />One view has it that the new direction in Fed policy is simply a temporary adjustment that has been necessary until conditions return to "normal". <strong>Upon closer inspection, however, it can also be seen that conditions across several dimensions have changed in ways that impinge upon the Fed put.<br /></strong><br /><strong>Changing conditions<br /></strong><br />One of the most damaging changes is the increasing realization that the key policy of Quantitative Easing (QE) often creates more trouble than it's worth. ECB executive director, <a href="https://www.bis.org/review/r240528d.pdf">Isabel Schnabel, recently noted</a> that "QE exposes central banks to considerable interest rate risk", that "losses [on government bonds] ... impede central banks&rsquo; ability to pursue their price stability mandate", and that "Surging asset prices do not only pose risks to financial stability but may also exacerbate wealth inequality" (h/t Russell Napier in his <em>Solid Ground</em> newsletter).<br /><br /><strong>She concludes, "The experience over the past 15 years suggests ... that QE can come with costs that might be higher than those of other policy instruments..."<br /> </strong><br />This was not an isolated, one-off comment either. Rather, it reflects new consensus thinking in central banking circles. In summarizing the annual report from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) for example, the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bd22ac3c-4cf9-4eed-b8d8-ec20103dfb8f">FT ($) noted</a>, "there are limits to prolonged monetary easing with diminishing returns and unwelcome side-effects". <strong>In short, central banks tried QE in a pinch, kept at it for fifteen years, and discovered it had toxic side-effects. Now, in order to mitigate political backlash, it is only retained for acute, and not chronic, conditions.<br /> </strong><br />Of course, this also highlights important ways in which the political environment has changed. After several decades during which capital was favored over labor, Covid lockdowns highlighted both the importance of &ldquo;essential&rdquo; blue collar jobs and the meager wage growth associated with those jobs. Covid proved a timely impetus for the political pendulum to start swinging back to wage earners.<br /><br />This shift in political priorities is problematic for the Fed in two ways. <strong>First, the "exacerbation of wealth inequality" caused by its policies puts it squarely in the cross-hairs of populist politics.</strong> Second, increasing political momentum behind wage increases for workers will make it increasingly difficult to keep inflation under control. Neither of these were big problems or concerns when the Fed put started.<br /><br />Finally, the changing character of geopolitics is also impinging on Fed policy. While the Fed had been able to implement its put in previous episodes with virtually no concern for ramifications outside the US, China's emergence as a competitive superpower and Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 fundamentally changed the landscape. Within this new context of superpower rivalry, unrestrained growth in federal debt is no longer an innocent happenstance, but rather a glaring geopolitical vulnerability.<br /><br />Soaring public debt is not the only weakness. The Fed's policy of maintaining excessively low interest rates for an extensive period of time did more than just create an incentive to consume too much debt; it also reduced the financial incentive for industrial companies to reinvest in their businesses. <strong>As a result, America&rsquo;s industrial capacity got hollowed out and its supply chains became much more vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. In short, the ramifications of the Fed put regime now very visibly conflict with the objectives of national security.<br /> </strong><br /><strong>Implications<br /></strong><br />These examples highlight just how much conditions have changed since the Fed first implemented its "put". As a result, the Fed is now much more constrained in effecting monetary policy and therefore much more constrained in effecting positive market outcomes. <strong>While the Fed would surely intervene in the event markets stopped functioning smoothly, the scope of its "put" is almost certainly far more conditional and far less expansive than it has been in the past. Effectively, the Fed's &ldquo;put&rdquo; is kaput.<br /> </strong><br />Today, the diminishing viability of the Fed put as policy contrasts sharply with the faith investors have in it to guard their investments. Indeed, investors still clamor for any little inkling of when the Fed may cut rates or otherwise ease financial conditions.&nbsp;<br /><br />Certainly some investors have become habituated to the Fed put and don't really give it much thought any more. Other investors remain steadfast in their belief in the Fed's ability to drive markets. Still others though, are increasingly aware of the constraints on the Fed and its ability to drive positive market outcomes.<br /><br />What holds everything together is that the Fed put is still common knowledge. Everyone knows that everyone believes the Fed put is still in place. <strong>This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy: As long as the belief system remains in place, the belief is the reality.<br /></strong><br />The problem with this dynamic is that it can be quite fragile; it can change very quickly. As <a href="https://www.epsilontheory.com/joe-biden-and-the-common-knowledge-game/">Ben Hunt wrote</a> about President Biden after the presidential debate,&nbsp;"That&rsquo;s the moment where we all saw what we all saw, that Joe Biden is not mentally competent to be president of the United States." He goes on, "This is about the moment in time that irrevocably changed what we all know that we all know about Joe Biden."<br /><br />Now, let's apply the same common knowledge framework to the Fed. Imagine a situation, not too far into the future, in which economic, political, and geopolitical forces continue limiting the Fed&rsquo;s room for maneuver. Maybe it&rsquo;s a combination of persistently high inflation and weak economic growth. Maybe it&rsquo;s a geopolitical event. It could be a lot of things.<br /><br />At some point, regardless of what the Fed does, or doesn&rsquo;t do, markets will be worse off. When that happens, everybody will know that everybody knows the Fed is severely constrained and can no longer dictate positive market outcomes.<br /><br />Worse, as Hunt describes, as long as "everyone in the world believes a certain piece of private information, no one will alter their behavior. Behavior changes&nbsp;ONLY when we believe that&nbsp;<em>everyone else&nbsp;</em>believes the information. THAT&rsquo;S what changes behavior." <strong>So, when everybody knows that everybody knows that the Fed no longer has the power to make the market keep going up, behavior will change. At that point, an important obstacle to shorting the market will be eliminated.<br /></strong><br /><strong>Conclusion<br /></strong><br />In summary, for many years investors have bestowed upon the Fed near-magical powers to drive markets higher. This belief system created a self-fulfilling prophecy that made it extremely difficult for investors to bet against.<br /><br />Over time, however, conditions have changed and now the costs of the Fed put have increased while its benefits have decreased. As a result, the day is approaching when the Fed will no longer be able to ensure positive market outcomes. This will mark the threshold of a new era of monetary policy and of market behavior.<br /><br />When that day comes, investors will no longer be able to rely on the Fed as their guardian angel; doing so will be futile. They will no longer be able to ignore risk. They will need to be able to weather turbulence and be able to withstand significant and persistent drawdowns. They will need to do analytical work.<br /><br />As the high waters of monetary largesse recede, it will become clear that a lot of investors have been swimming naked.&nbsp;</font><br /></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Areté market review Q124]]></title><link><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q124]]></link><comments><![CDATA[https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q124#comments]]></comments><pubDate>Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:46:16 GMT</pubDate><category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.areteam.com/blog/arete-market-review-q124</guid><description><![CDATA[by David Robertson, CFAApril 2024&#8203;The first quarter was another banner one for stocks with total returns for the S&amp;P 500 up over 10%. Artificial intelligence was the dominant theme and the Magnificent Seven stocks led the way. The prospect of rate cuts by the Fed provided an additional tailwind.This rebound has been a welcome development for investors in light of a scary selloff that began last summer and persisted into the fall. Can recent momentum be maintained or is the rally likely [...] ]]></description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="paragraph"><font size="3">by David Robertson, CFA<br />April 2024<br /><br />&#8203;The first quarter was another banner one for stocks with total returns for the S&amp;P 500 up over 10%. Artificial intelligence was the dominant theme and the Magnificent Seven stocks led the way. The prospect of rate cuts by the Fed provided an additional tailwind.<br /><br />This rebound has been a welcome development for investors in light of a scary selloff that began last summer and persisted into the fall. Can recent momentum be maintained or is the rally likely to be derailed?&nbsp;What should investors be on the lookout for?<br /><br /><strong>The only game in town<br /></strong><br />A good starting point for analyzing the investment landscape is to recognize the prevailing market narrative continues to be that monetary authorities are running the show. This is understandable since central bankers have basically commandeered markets with extraordinary monetary policy ever since the GFC.<br /><br />As such, there has been a logic to vigilantly following central bank communications; that's how you stay attuned to the primary force driving markets. <strong>The focus on monetary policy had the advantages of being simple to understand, easy to implement ... and mostly right.<br /></strong><br />Ever since Covid, however, the paradigm of central bankers driving markets has been less consistently effective in guiding investors. While massive liquidity infusions during the pandemic fueled a huge rally in stocks, the magnitude and duration of rate hikes by the Fed fooled a lot of investors. While a dovish pivot by the Fed late last year reversed an ugly market slide, it is looking increasingly misguided today.<br /><br /><strong>Key change<br /></strong><br />In short, while monetary policy has remained an important factor, it has been joined by other forces impinging on markets as well. As a result, the investment landscape has become more complex and more complicated than can be easily explained by monetary policy alone.<br /><br />For starters, Covid created an opportunity for governments, especially in the US, to rediscover their power to spend. That changed things by igniting inflation and therefore by also imposing new constraints on monetary policy.<br /><br />In addition, Russia&rsquo;s invasion of Ukraine also marked an important inflection in the investment landscape. Most immediately, the invasion raised awareness of the potential for geopolitical conflict and the risk to supplies of vital commodities such as oil. More fundamentally, however, the event helped illuminate an even broader geopolitical conflict emerging between China and Russia on one side and Europe and the US on the other.<br /><br />Stepping back even further, the election of Donald Trump as President in 2016 can be seen as another important break from the past. As much as anything, that election signified growing political discontent with the broad policy prescriptions of the neoliberal order. The benefits of free trade and cheap goods from China had become outweighed by the costs of stagnant real wages and ever-increasing levels of debt.<br /><br />Initially, each of these events came across as striking, but isolated. With the benefit of hindsight and a little more perspective, however, it is easier to see how they interrelate.<br /><br />The election of Trump can be seen as the swing of the political pendulum from &ldquo;capital&rdquo; to &ldquo;labor&rdquo;. Covid can be seen as a trigger that reawakened the ability and willingness of governments to be more muscular with public policy. The Russian invasion of Ukraine can be seen as the crystallization of broader geopolitical conflict that catalyzed the more aggressive use of the dollar-based financial system as a strategic tool by the US.<br /><br /><strong>&ldquo;Profound structural change&rdquo;<br /></strong><br />Taken together, these events signal more than just incremental global developments. They represent elements of a bigger picture of &ldquo;profound structural change in geopolitics and in how the international monetary system works&rdquo;, as described by strategist Russell Napier in his recent <em>Solid Ground</em> newsletter.<br /><br />In an important sense, this reckoning was inevitable. The neoliberal order promoted free trade with a general world view of &ldquo;live and let live&rdquo;. That was all fine and good as long as it basically worked for everyone.<br /><br />In recent years, however, China got bigger, stronger, and more determined to dictate its own terms of engagement. In addition, while having the dollar as the global reserve currency certainly provided benefits to the US, increasingly it also came with undesirable side effects &mdash; such as absorbing China&rsquo;s vast quantities of exports. In short, the neoliberal order was unsustainable.<br /><br />As a result, the two geopolitical superpowers are now at an impasse. The old system doesn&rsquo;t work for either of them anymore, and they have different views as to what should replace it. This implies an ongoing struggle for the foreseeable future at the very least. More specifically, it is likely the global financial system will splinter into two systems, one for China and the countries in its orbit and one for the US and the countries in its orbit.<br /><br /><strong>Perspective<br /></strong><br />For investors looking for guidance into the investment landscape, a couple of things happen when the geopolitical perspective is incorporated. One is that some phenomena which had appeared mysterious as viewed solely through the lens of domestic monetary policy start making more sense. That&rsquo;s because geopolitical goals trump purely domestic goals.<br /><br />This can probably be seen most clearly in regard to US monetary policy. For example, in 2021, after long debating whether inflation even needed to be addressed, the Fed quickly and dramatically changed tune in 2022.<br /><br />While inflation was certainly coming in higher than the Fed expected, it&rsquo;s interesting to note the change in sentiment also coincided with Russia&rsquo;s invasion of Ukraine. In other words, the policy change makes more sense in the context of <em>both</em> higher inflation <em>and</em> a geopolitical agenda that involved tightening financial conditions on global competitors like Russia and China.<br /><br />The impact of geopolitical forces on US monetary policy was explicitly recognized by Michael Kao in a recent <a href="https://www.urbankaoboy.com/p/re-macrousdoil-the-battle-of-the">Substack post ($)</a> when he said, &ldquo;I am watching BOJ and PBOC closely, because what they do may actually determine Fed policy more than anything &nbsp;&hellip;&rdquo;<br /><br />In a similar vein, a geopolitical perspective enables one to see how different pieces fit into the puzzle. For example, <a href="https://twitter.com/crossbordercap/status/1778308912975888476">Michael Howell recently posted</a> on X, &ldquo;Seems like 'weak Yen' is deliberate? It must be hurting <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/China?src=hashtag_click">#China</a>? Capital Wars??!&rdquo; <strong>Such comments portray monetary policy actions as being deeply entwined in a giant geopolitical chess game, and not just a function of domestic policy goals.<br /></strong><br /><strong>Long live the Fed!<br /></strong><br />Given the improved explanatory power of geopolitics, why do so many strategists and investors still focus on domestic monetary policy? Surely, one reason is inertia. During the heydays of the neoliberal order, geopolitical squabbles could be faded by investors because it was in almost everyone&rsquo;s interest to carry on as usual. Dustups were quickly resolved. That has changed.<br /><br />Another reason is the power of monetary policy to drive financial assets has been exaggerated. Other forces have also been at work that have amplified the impact of monetary policy. The proliferation of passive investing and the use of share buybacks both created strong feedback loops which added fuel to the fire. <strong>Unusually strong returns for financial assets made it easy for investors to ride the wave, made it easy to overestimate the role of central bankers, and also made it hard to do anything else.<br /></strong><br />In addition, a lot of investment careers, retirements, early retirements, and personal portfolios have been made on the back of easy monetary policy. As a result, it will be very hard for any of these people to seriously consider an alternative explanation to what has worked so well for them in the past.<br /><br /><strong>The road ahead<br /></strong><br />In the short- to medium-term, faith in monetary authorities probably won&rsquo;t cause investors too much harm. Given the upcoming election and the historical patterns of the political economy, there will likely be a broad push to ensure the re-election of the incumbent administration.<br /><br />Longer-term, however, namely beyond the election in November, the faith in monetary authorities to dictate the investment landscape looks misplaced.<br /><br />For one, as the geopolitical struggle between the US and China grows, so too do those priorities elevate over those of purely domestic price stabilization. For another, a lot of factors that affect inflation are outside the control of the US. The signals from historic domestic inflation trends are becoming progressively less useful.<br /><br />Finally, what happens to investors is not just a function of new developments and actions, but the cessation of dynamics that investors have grown accustomed to and often taken for granted.<br /><br />As <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/9f400538-645f-4c80-b206-0de6c51dc75f">Russell Napier highlights</a> in the FT, &ldquo;This forced buying [of US Treasuries by emerging market countries], regardless of price, effectively decoupled the risk-free rate from the nominal growth rate in the developed world.&rdquo; This had the effect of creating &ldquo;a persistent and artificially large gap between nominal growth rates and the discount rate, thus inflating asset prices and facilitating a rise in gearing.&rdquo;<br /><br /><strong>With China being a big part of that trend, and now charting a different course for the future, it is reasonable to expect not only a different outcome, but the mirror image. That would be deflating asset prices and forcing a reduction in gearing.<br /> </strong><br /><strong>Implications<br /></strong><br />In a general sense, the heightened level of geopolitical conflict and the reformation of the global financial order increase the baseline level of uncertainty in the investment landscape. With two heavyweight global competitors going at it and lots of moving parts, a lot of different things can happen. Over the medium term, this can be expected to weigh on financial assets.<br /><br />Further, as Napier explains, &ldquo;The loss of access to Chinese productive capacity brings with it higher global inflation.&rdquo; Higher inflation means higher yields will be demanded for bonds which will result in lower prices.<br /><br />There is likely to be a mixed reaction in stocks. The need for the US to rebuild industrial capacity will result in abnormal growth in key strategic industries. However, higher inflation threatens to lower valuation multiples.<br /><br />Also, amid ongoing geopolitical conflict and the splintering of the global financial system, gold is likely to be increasingly useful as a store of value.<br />&#8203;<br />Finally, as to the question, <strong>&ldquo;What should investors be on the lookout for?&rdquo;, the answer is &ldquo;profound structural change in geopolitics and in how the international monetary system works&rdquo;. No amount of parsing FOMC press releases or recent CPI data is going to accomplish that. What can help navigate the new landscape, according to Napier, is &ldquo;a deep understanding of financial history&rdquo;.</strong><br /></font></div>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>